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I. INTRODUCTION

The filed tariff doctrine, a longstanding and fundamental
precept of public utility and common carrier regulation, figures
prominently in modern regulatory law. To most, the doctrine seems
technical and arcane. But, by influencing when courts will hear cases
involving regulated firms, the filed tariff doctrine has an alarmingly
sweeping scope and effect beyond which few other legal doctrines can
lay claim. Based on an examination of the filed tariff doctrine's
history, as well as its purposes and economic and policy implications,
this Article concludes that the doctrine should surrender its shield,
which seriously limits judicial enforcement of competition and
consumer protection norms affecting regulated firms.
Throughout the twentieth century, when natural monopoly
regulation reigned supreme, price controls of utilities were a
predominant tool for agency regulators.' In order to mitigate the
effects of granting a service monopoly, agency regulators actively
regulated the price of various utilities, such as transportation,
telecommunications, and gas and electric power, based on the cost of
providing service. 2 By statute or by regulation, many agencies
required-and some still require-regulated firms to submit tariffs,
including the prices, terms, and conditions under which they offered
service. In the conventional scenario, the tariff represents the price of
service (traditionally based on a cost-of-service determination) and
often becomes effective by operation of law if not disapproved by the
1.
See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); STEPHEN J.
BROWN & DAVID S. SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1986); ALFRED E. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1988).

2.

Cost-of-service rates also included compensation for a fair rate of return to investors.
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agency regulator within a certain time period, or following an
3
evaluation and affirmative approval by the regulator.
Traditionally, agency regulators have had the authority to
police these tariffs to determine that their terms were reasonable and
did not unjustly discriminate against consumers. In essence, the filed
tariff doctrine treats a utility tariff as a firm-specific regulation,
freezing in place the tariffs rates and other conditions and precluding
their modification by anyone other than the agency or (with a new
tariff filing) the regulated firm. For example, if an electric or
telecommunications utility files a tariff for its services with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the doctrine precludes the utility
from offering certain customers discounts that deviate from the filed
tariffs terms. Originally designed to protect consumers from
discriminatory rate treatment by utilities, the scope of the doctrine's
protection is not limited to rates, but extends also to service terms and
4
conditions.
The filed tariff doctrine also has the effect of ensuring that the
federal judiciary or others, especially state regulators, do not exercise
jurisdiction over utility conduct that is consistent with a firm-specific
tariff filed with a federal agency. This Article focuses its analysis on
this aspect of the filed tariff doctrine. I suggest that the filed tariff
doctrine has become a "shield," providing a type of firm-specific
immunity from antitrust and state law claims in federal courts. 5 As
3.
For a discussion of price regulation by federal agencies such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Federal Power
Commission (FPC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) predecessor, see THE
CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Paul W. MacAvoy ed., 1970). See Joseph D. Kearney
& Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1323, 1361-63 (1998) (providing a recent evaluation of changes to the regulatory approaches
of such agencies).
4.
Hence, the terms "filed rate" doctrine and "filed tariff' doctrine are, as hereinafter,
frequently used synonymously.

5.
Although I believe that courts have come to treat the filed tariff doctrine, which often
applies to antitrust claims, as a type of immunity, it differs doctrinally from implied antitrust
immunity. Unlike the filed tariff doctrine, implied antitrust immunity is not firm-specific, but
exempts from antitrust enforcement industry-wide conduct made pursuant to an industry's
regulatory scheme. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("When faced with implied immunity questions, the courts have undertaken a case-by-case
approach which analyzes the particular industry, the applicable regulatory scheme and
procedures, and the statutory history to determine whether operation of the antitrust laws can
be reconciled with the regulatory scheme."). Since the key judicial inquiry in assessing implied
antitrust immunity is whether Congress's intended regulatory program presents a plain
repugnancy to application of the antitrust laws, it operates predominantly as a rule of statutory
construction. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975)
(arguing that implied antitrust immunity "can be justified only by a convincing showing of clear
repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system."); see also Martin
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utility lawyers are well aware, a utility with a tariff on file with an
agency such as FERC or the FCC can depend on the filed tariff
doctrine to ensure that disputes regarding service under the tariff will
be resolved, if at all, by federal regulatory agencies, not by courts or
state regulators.
In this regard, the filed tariff doctrine continues to play a
significant role in recent disputes surrounding the deregulation of
telecommunications and electric utilities. For example, during
California's now-infamous deregulation crisis, the doctrine was
applied by a federal appellate court to bar the state's Governor from
commandeering contracts to deliver wholesale electric power to
utilities, favoring federal regulation over the state's approach to crisis
management. 6 It also has been used as a full defense to state contract
and tort suits7 as well as to federal antitrust8 claims brought against
utilities operating in a deregulatory environment. In one of the most
significant applications yet of the filed tariff doctrine in the
deregulatory era, utilities have claimed that the California Public
Utility Commission's refusal to increase retail rates as wholesale
prices for purchased power skyrocketed is illegal under the filed tariff
doctrine, since FERC had approved a deregulated market for
wholesale prices. 9 The filed tariff doctrine remains central to the
bankruptcy proceedings involving Pacific Gas & Electric Company

Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Implied Immunity from the Antitrust Laws, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22,
2003, at 3 (discussing recent court decisions and implied antitrust immunity); cf. In re Stock
Exchanges Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding, based
on an assessment of congressional intent, that that a finding of implied immunity was necessary
to preserve the Securities and Exchange Commission's listing and trading of equity options);
Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 803 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding implied
immunity bars an antitrust price fixing claim for re-sale of stock following an initial public
offering, which the SEC also regulates, because otherwise the claim would present a "plain
repugnancy" to Congress's intended regulatory program).
Even where there is no implied
antitrust immunity, the filed tariff doctrine may still bar an antitrust claim. As argued in this
Article, the filed tariff doctrine is a firm-specific defense and focuses in its applications on
variables beyond congressional intent, even though this Article also recognizes that courts
increasingly treat the doctrine as a rule of statutory construction. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
6.
See Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2001).
7.
See Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2272 (2003).
8.
See Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 418-24 (1st Cir. 2000).
9.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that the filed tariff doctrine precludes the state of California from setting retail rates
below FERC-authorized wholesale rates, prohibiting the recovery of losses, and setting for
hearing issues of fact regarding PG&E's claim for recovery). In one context, the court settled the
issue (allowing the utility to recover $3.3 billion of its $6.3 billion claimed loss), but the utility's
argument, if successful, would have prevented the state of California from limiting recovery in
retail rates to costs incurred in accordance with FERC-approved tariffs. S. Cal. Edison Co. v.
Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
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(PG&E). PG&E has invoked the doctrine to bar objection to approval
of its reorganization plan by rivals who allege that they are owed
antitrust damages for PG&E's allegedly monopolistic conduct over
power transmission, causing harm in the range of $1.2 billion. 10
Given the repeated use of the filed tariff doctrine to determine
regulatory forum-agencies vs. courts or federal vs. state regulationthe continued importance of the filed tariff doctrine in working out the
appropriate balance between regulation and market-based solutions
for industries, such as electric power, cannot be denied. Part II of this
Article details how, long before deregulation, the filed tariff doctrine's
rationales were intellectually suspect. One recent appellate panel
describes its legal foundations as "extremely creaky,"'" but it is best
understood not as a single legal rule. Instead, the filed tariff doctrine
is an amalgam of several distinct-though often interrelated-reasons
for a court's refusal to consider a case. In this part of the Article, I
unravel three constituent (often-confused) strands of the filed tariff
doctrine-unjust discrimination, federal preemption, and deferenceand discuss how each fails or is unnecessary. The unjust
discrimination strand of the doctrine was concerned with protecting
consumers, but the doctrine was hardly necessary for purposes of
doing so, even under a rate regulation regime. Moreover, the
consumer protection rationale was turned on its head as the filed
tariff doctrine became a shield for regulated firms against litigation,
including competitor and consumer suits in federal and state courts.
Further, the filed tariff doctrine was not particularly necessary for,
nor successful at, promoting the broader institutional goals of
clarifying the scope of federal jurisdiction to provide uniformity (the
federal preemption strand), or respecting the deference of expert
regulators (the deference strand).
Part III addresses the incentive, welfare, and deterrence
implications of the filed tariff doctrine. The doctrine creates incentives
10. See In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 295 B.R. 635, 640-41 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003). Today,
California Independent Service Operator, which is constrained by PG&E's past anticompetitive
transmission capacity decisions, sets transmission congestion charges, not PG&E. See id. at 655.
The basic claim is that PG&E, which controlled substantial parts of California's transmission
grid prior to its Chapter 11 proceeding, by making decisions about its expansion, has engaged in
anticompetitive conduct, including monopolistic control of essential facilities and price squeeze,
and should be liable for damages. See id. at 657. Although this antitrust claim has not yet been
litigated, case law allows consideration of the recovery of judgments in the approval of a Chapter
11 plan. See, e.g., Pizza of Hawaii, Inc. v. Shakey's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985)
(directing a bankruptcy court to consider as part of its feasibility analysis in approving the plan
the possibility that an objector would recover a large judgment in a civil case); In re Dennis
Ponte, Inc., 61 B.R. 296, 296 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (requiring bankruptcy court to "tak[e] into
consideration the merits of [the objector's] administrative claim").
11. Town of Norwood, 202 F.3d at 420.
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for private firms to divulge information to federal regulators, but these
incentives must be balanced against the prospect of private firms'
strategic abuse of the tariffing process to secure the forum-shopping
benefits of the shield. Courts have never been effective at monitoring
this balance, resulting in a doctrine and an accompanying regulatory
system that largely ignore the strategic behavior of private firms in
tariffing. Put simply, application of the doctrine has allowed
determination of the forum for enforcement of market remedies to
hinge on firm-specific private behavior, rather than assessment of the
public interest in deterrence of market abuses.
Deregulation-more accurately, "competitive restructuring"makes this private forum selection a much more significant problem
for regulatory law. The discord of enforcing filed tariffs in a truly
competitive pricing environment is obvious. Deregulation of industries
is transforming the role of tariffs in the regulatory process away from
the traditional cost-of-service mandate, and towards the goals of
structural market definition and information provision. The
competition policies behind this transformation, which rely on
flexibility in pricing, call into serious question the workability of a
filed tariff as an effective mechanism for agency regulation of markets.
In a competitive environment, the traditional principle of
nondiscrimination in tariffs, applied with the rigor the filed tariff
doctrine invites, is questionable and may even prove harmful.
But, in a deregulated environment, which may invite unfair
and anticompetitive market conduct, the filed tariff doctrine presents
a more nuanced and arguably more serious tension for regulatory law.
As formerly regulated markets are deregulated, the filed tariff
doctrine has implications for the way that the legal system deters
violations of market norms. Because agencies often lack the authority
or resources to implement effective regulation of competitive markets,
the doctrine not only thwarts price flexibility on the part of regulators
and private firms, but also precludes much contract, tort, fraud, and
antitrust litigation against-as well as state regulation of-utilities.
This creates an enforcement gap, given the limited reach of federal
agency regulation. Congress, however, has been slow to expand the
jurisdiction and resources of agencies to address deregulated markets.
Thus, by encouraging firm-specific manipulation of tariffing as a
forum-shopping strategy, the filed tariff doctrine contributes to a
widening of the enforcement gap in deregulated markets. As formerly
regulated industries move towards open market competition,
establishing market norms becomes more important than ever. The
filed tariff doctrine, however, can result in a type of radical
deregulation-markets absent common law and antitrust protections.
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Part IV discusses how the judiciary, whose published opinions
are largely oblivious to the inconsistencies between the filed tariff
doctrine and competition policies, continues to fail in monitoring the
harmful effects of the filed tariff shield. In fact, courts have embraced
the doctrine in ways that are inconsistent with its original design,
affirmatively harming competition, which ultimately injures
consumers through higher prices. The shield has become fortified, as
courts mandate it even where regulators want its repudiation. Some
decisions, for example, flatly contradict the agency deference strand of
the filed tariff doctrine. 12 Even more recently, courts have invoked the
shield to declare winners in jurisdictional battles surrounding electric
power deregulation. 13 As these examples illustrate, fortification of the
shield has become a refuge for regulated firms, leaving both regulators
and courts with few affirmative tools to promote competition or deter
and remedy market abuses.
Part V proposes some ways courts might more actively monitor
the jurisdictional impacts of tariffs. I argue that courts should not
afford firm-specific tariffs any independent, legally significant role.
The filed tariff shield is frequently invoked as shorthand for more
careful scrutiny of regulation under the federal preemption doctrine or
as a type of antitrust defense or immunity. Direct analysis of dual
jurisdictional problems under these alternative doctrines, rather than
invocation of the filed tariff shield, provides an opportunity for courts
to safeguard against strategic abuses of the regulatory process in a
dual enforcement regime.
Today, the filed tariff doctrine is not only unnecessary, given
other doctrines that federal courts can invoke to refuse to consider a
claim. The doctrine also creates perverse incentives for private firms
to forum shop by strategically over disclosing information to
regulators, thus thwarting the ability of both regulators and courts to
monitor and deter violations of market norms and ultimately causing
considerable harm to consumers. It is time for the filed tariff shield to
surrender to a dual enforcement regime that includes common law
and statutory remedies enforced by courts. Doing so will inevitably
increase uncertainty for firms in newly deregulated markets, but this
uncertainty will simultaneously serve a deterrence function and
encourage private firms to focus their lobbying efforts on Congress to
expand agency jurisdiction and enforcement resources, rather than
strategically disclosing information in the regulatory process to benefit
from the ultra-immunity of the filed tariff shield.

12.
13.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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II. FROM SWORD TO SHIELD
Throughout the twentieth century, courts invoked the filed
tariff doctrine as an independent legal basis for refusing to modify, or
allow modifications to, rates approved by agency regulators. Courts
have extended the doctrine to apply not only to rates, but also to terms
and conditions approved by regulators, such as service quality terms
included in tariffs. The doctrine's original goals focused on consumer
protection-in particular, protection against unjust discrimination in
service pricing (the "unjust discrimination" strand). At the same time,
institutional concerns of federalism (the "federal preemption" strand)
and deference to regulators (the "deference" strand) helped to justify
it. With time, this doctrine that began as a consumer protection sword
evolved into a shield-a type of ultra-immunity for regulated firms
from lawsuits designed to protect consumers and competition.
A. Origins-ProtectingConsumers from Unjust Discrimination
The filed tariff doctrine affords the contractual rights of a firmspecific tariff the full legal force of other agency regulations. A "classic
illustration" of an intermediate solution-neither purely in rem nor
purely in personam-in which the law protects duties beyond mere
contract but short of property, the doctrine was described by
Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith as follows:
Under this doctrine, utilities and common carriers must establish their rates and
services in standard form contracts called tariffs, which must be made available on
equal and nondiscriminatory terms to all customers. Deviations from the filed tariff are
not permitted, but the relevant regulatory agency is authorized to review and adjust the
terms to ensure that they are "just and reasonable" to affected customers. In effect, the
singular provider of services establishes an in personam right which is made available
to a numerous class of customers, and the customers (who remain rationally ignorant of
the details of the tariff) are then protected from exploitation by the provider through
agency oversight.14

The traditional rate regulation process, which set rates based on an
evaluation of the cost of providing service, provided a sufficient
opportunity to protect the public interest in approved tariffs. As costof-service regulation was prevalent in the context of most regulated
utilities, the judicially created doctrine persisted throughout the
twentieth century and, as is discussed below, continues to apply to
many regulated industries today.
One of the earliest cases discussing the legal impacts of a filed
tariff arose in the context of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which
14. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 808 n.112 (2002).

2003]

LOWERING THE FILED TARIFF SHIELD

1599

played a central role in regulation of railroad transportation rates. In
1906, only a year after Lochner 15 was decided, the Supreme Court
interpreted the ICA to require enforcement of the "filed rate." 16 The
Court reasoned that the statute's purposes were "to secure equality of
rates as to all and to destroy favoritism," and noted that the latter
purpose could be accomplished "by requiring the publication of tariffs
and by prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding
rebates, preferences and all other forms of undue discrimination." 17 A
year later, the Court concluded that a shipper seeking damages under
the ICA based on the alleged unreasonableness of a carrier's rates
must do so through the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), not
the courts, because the agency alone "is vested with the power
originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established
schedule."18 Although adherence to the filed rate might, in some
cases, create hardship, the Supreme Court has stated that this
doctrine "embodies the policy which had been adopted by Congress in
the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prohibit unjust
19
discrimination."
Without doubt, the nondiscrimination principle is historically
the primary reason courts require adherence to a filed, published rate.
In original design, the doctrine was intended to serve as a sword to
protect consumers from monopolistic price discrimination, such as a
railroad charging different rates to customers of different states, or
charging the shipping companies with whom it competes exorbitant
prices, without justifications based on the cost of providing service to
the customer. 20 Unlike
other exclusionary practices, price
discrimination does not necessarily change the monopolist's output

15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905) (invalidating a state law setting maximum
working hours for bakery workers on the ground that it exceeded state police power and
infringed on individuals' liberty-the right to work). It seems ironic that the Court, in applying
the filed tariff doctrine, enforced state regulation during a time when the Court was also viewed
by many as imposing "Mr. Herbert Spencer's laissez-faire economics." See id. at 75-76 (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Yet, this apparent paradox can be reconciled with the Lochner era's thirst for
upholding contract and property rights, as the filed tariff doctrine gives legal status to these
rights even where they were based in part on regulation.
16. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 200 U.S. 361
(1906).
17. Id. at 391.
18. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
19. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
20. Discrimination in utility rates included "a wide variety of kickbacks, gratuities, and
other devices that agitated much of the public." Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1333. The
discontent over discrimination in rates in the railroad and other industries produced a rich and
colorful contemporaneous literature. See, e.g., FRANK NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS (Viking Press 1986)
(1901); IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904).
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level (though if imperfect it may); however, the practice is generally
condemned to the extent it maximizes the monopolist's profits
(representing a transfer from consumers to the monopolist), while also
encouraging the monopolist to waste resources in maintaining its
21
dominant market position.
For price-regulated industries, such as infrastructure utilities,
price discrimination can create a more specific problem. Unregulated
price discrimination can lead to overcapacity and inefficient use of
resources. Absent a prohibition on price discrimination, a utility may
preferentially charge some customers, perhaps those who have
substitutes for the utility's service (e.g., the large municipal or
industrial customer), less than the average cost of providing service to
them. To the extent that the utility does so, rate regulation would
allow the utility to still recover the cost of providing service to the
preferentially treated customers by increasing the rates it charges
other customers. For instance, assume an electric utility has three
municipal customers. The total cost to the utility of building a plant
to serve the three customers is $660,000 annually, with each customer
having an equal average cost of service of $220,000. Suppose that one
of the municipal customers, X, also owns a hydroelectric plant, which
it can operate to displace its demand for the utility's power at a cost of
$200,000 annually, saving $20,000 a year over the cost of purchasing
power from the utility. The utility can cover its total costs and also
maximize its customer base by discriminating in its rates--charging
X, say, $190,000 annually and charging each of the other customers
$235,000 a year.
However, this is not efficient. The lower cost plant will not be
built, but instead the utility will overinvest in its own capital
facilities, using price discrimination as a strategy to foreclose
competitors from using more efficient alternatives, such as the
hydroelectric plant. Since price discrimination provides the utility
little incentive to avoid over-investment in capital, it potentially leads
to a higher than optimal capital-to-labor ratio in the industry.22 By

21. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 569-70 (2d ed. 1999).

22. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint,52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052 (1962) (applying monopoly theory to the telephone and
telegraph industry). Economists have found support for this problem, known as the "AverchJohnson effect." See Leon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53 (1974) (supporting the Averch-Johnson effect with empirical

data on electric power plants); H. Craig Peterson, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 111 (1975) (finding support); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return
Regulation and Efficiency in Production:An Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL

J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 38 (1974) (verifying empirically the Averch-Johnson effect).

The

2003]

LOWERING THE FILED TARIFF SHIELD

1601

contrast, prohibiting price discrimination would encourage the utility
to more carefully expand capital to serve individual customers based
on the cost of providing service to them individually, thus increasing
23
efficiency in the use of capital resources.
At the same time, since perfect price discrimination would
allow the monopolist to expand output to include customers who
otherwise would be priced out of the market, as a matter of economic
theory this principle against nondiscrimination in rates is hardly
uncontroversial. 24 While it may not be universally accepted by
economists, 25 though, the "unjust discrimination" prohibition is a wellestablished standard for evaluating potential monopoly pricing abuses
in public utility law.
The basic nondiscrimination principle arose in the context of
judicial interpretation of statutes, such as the ICA. Two aspects of
this history are significant for the modern filed tariff doctrine. First,
even though the doctrine began with judicial or agency interpretation
of statutes, the Supreme Court has come to treat it as a type of
statutory precedent. As such, today the doctrine serves to bind both
courts and agencies to the original judicial interpretation of regulatory

empirical results, however, seem mixed, at best, particularly if the expected rate of return is
below the cost of capital. See William J. Boyes, An Empirical Examination of the Averch.
Johnson Effect, 14 ECON. INQUIRY 25 (1976) (finding no empirical support for the AverchJohnson effect); W. Davis Dechert, Has the Averch-Johnson Effect Been Theoretically Justified?, 8
J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1, 1, 16 (1984) (showing that regulated firms tend to
undercapitalize-not
overcapitalize, as Averch-Johnson would predict-in relation to
unregulated firms). For a review of the evidence, see Paul Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Regulation
in Theory and Practice:An Overview, in 1 STUDIES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 10-14 (Gary
Fromm ed., 1981).
23. A related, and more general, criticism of price discrimination in antitrust regulation is
that it encourages the monopolist to leverage its primary market into a second market. See
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515-16
(1985); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical Strategies by Dominant
Firms, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1235-38 (1992).
24. Ramsey pricing, or raising prices in inverse proportion to customer demand elasticity,
provides a theory of value-based pricing that can minimize the deadweight loss associated with
price discrimination. See STEPHEN J. BROWN & DAVID S. SIBLEY, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY
PRICING 41 (1986). Chicago-school theory sees price discrimination as bringing a monopolistic
market closer to a competitive one and thus reducing the "misallocative effects" of monopoly. See
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979)
(discussing perfect price discrimination); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, at 567-68.
25. A leading regulated industries treatise, for example, indicates that "undue
discrimination is really not an efficiency issue; rather, it has to do with the fairness of the
existing set of prices in the sense of whether one group may be 'subsidizing' another group." W.
KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 377 (3d ed., MIT Press 2000).

The treatise authors elaborate, however, that to the extent that price discrimination is evaluated
in ratemaking, the average cost method for calculating rates will produce the most efficient
result. See id. at 377-78. Further, the authors elaborate, the average cost method will promote
least-cost production in circumstances where natural monopoly is sustainable. Id. at 378.
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statutes, leaving Congress the primary responsibility for the filed
26
tariff doctrine.
Second, although the filed tariff doctrine is based in part on
statutory interpretation, courts also historically drew on common law
notions of contract-and to a lesser extent property-in fashioning
this regulatory law principle. The doctrine allows courts to imply a
firm-specific regulatory commitment from contracts approved by or
filed with regulators.2 7 Once a legitimately filed rate is established,
customers can invoke the doctrine to preclude a utility from charging
services to them or others that deviate from the filed rate. The firm
too can invoke the doctrine to preclude variations from the filed rate
by courts or state regulators. In this sense, the filed tariff doctrine
facilitates regulatory commitment, binding and enhancing the
predictability of the administrative state. 28 This commitment, which
some commentators afford a quasi-property status, 29 encourages firms
to make investments, even where government regulation and the
prospect of its change are pervasive.
The filed tariff doctrine was originally intended to protect
consumers, but to the extent the doctrine provides private firms an
opportunity to forum shop-precluding federal court or state
consideration of claims-the regulated firm is also a primary
beneficiary. Once a rate is approved by federal regulators, a utility
can invoke the filed rate as a basis for precluding federal or state
courts from deviating from the approved tariff. Courts exercise their
jurisdiction to allow deviation from the filed rate only if the tariff is
invalid, which depends upon an affirmative showing of unreasonable
terms-a difficult threshold given deference to regulators by the

26.
27.

For further discussion of this aspect of the doctrine, see infra Part IV.A.
On the significance of regulatory commitment to the development of the utility industry,

see generally J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1997).

28. See, e.g., AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 221-24 (1998) (responding to
regulated firms by invoking the filed tariff doctrine to preclude the FCC from moving away from
its tariffing requirements); infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. Typically, in the regulatory
context, government agreements with private actors have been considered binding only insofar
as they set out in clear terms that the state will not depart from the terms of the deal and that
the state will bear damages if it does. See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (allowing a damages claim for change to a monopoly
franchise only insofar as the state has expressly agreed to indemnify private firms against policy
changes). While the filed tariff doctrine does not require the government to pay damages for
changes in regulation, by giving a filed tariff preemptive legal status over other laws it
constrains when regulators can change the conditions under which regulated firms operate.
29. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 27, at 213 (arguing that that abrogation of tariffs is a
compensable confiscation of utility property).
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courts in judicial review of agency-determined rates. 30 Effectively, a
utility can protect its expectations in the filed tariff, even though rates
or other service conditions may be potentially fraudulent under state
law principles or otherwise violate market norms, including consumer
protection and federal antitrust laws. When the doctrine applies,
utilities can be confident that the primary consumer protection and
fraud requirements are imposed on them by regulators, not by courts.
As a result, the rate regulation process becomes the central policymaking forum for establishing utility rates and most service terms
and conditions. When the doctrine applies, courts are not completely
irrelevant, but their primary role is one of reviewing agency decisions
on appeal, not acting as the primary regulator of utility-customer, or
utility-utility, relationships.
The filed tariff doctrine's benefit for regulated firms is further
illustrated by the consistency of the protection of regulatory
commitments, facilitated by the predictability of tariffs, with the
Lochner era, during which courts created the doctrine. Lochner, of
course, provided strong constitutional protections for property
owners. 3 1 In the utility arena, Lochner is widely understood to have
reaffirmed Smyth v. Ames, which held that regulators' failure to allow
a utility to recover the fair value of its investment results is
confiscation of the utility's property.3 2 While utilities could benefit
from the new constitutional order brought on by the Lochner era, the
invocation of constitutional protections for investor property interests
required resort to the judiciary and depended on factually complex
and technical constitutional arguments. Put simply, courts were
never very competent at assessing the fair value of utility property.
As Lochner faded from the constitutional landscape, so too did the
constitutional protections of utility property. By 1944, the Supreme
Court reduced constitutional protections to an evaluation of the final
product of the regulatory process: So long as the "end result" is just
and reasonable, regulators can act with confidence that their rates
33
and other decisions do not effectuate an unconstitutional taking.
Since then, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a single utility
34
tariff on takings grounds.

30. See Leigh H. Martin, Note, Deregulatory Takings, Stranded Investments and the
Regulatory Contract in a DeregulatedElectric Utility Industry, 31 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1206 (1997).
31. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
33. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
34. See Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1569 (1999)
(predicting that the Supreme Court will no longer use Smyth v. Ames to invalidate takings);
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J.
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Although Lochner's substantive constitutional constraints on
the regulatory process were never particularly successful, almost
completely dying out in the last half of the twentieth century, the filed
tariff doctrine has lived on as a way for utilities to create a property
right of sorts in an approved tariff. From the perspective of the
regulated firm, since tariffs are almost always presumptively
constitutional and are subject to judicial deference on appeal, it makes
sense to focus lobbying and litigation resources on the agency
regulatory process. 35 The filed tariff doctrine protects this investment
by giving the product of the regulatory process a legal entitlement
against intervention by the judiciary and state regulators. In 1951,
for example, the Supreme Court held all tariffs filed with and accepted
by the Federal Power Commission, FERC's predecessor, to be binding
on the federal courts. 36 The Court reasoned that a party to the
contracts "can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed
rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not
even the court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other
terms."37 Though courts were not very successful in protecting utility
property through constitutional doctrines, such as the takings clause
and substantive due process, during the twentieth century, they did
indirectly protect regulatory commitments through the filed tariff
doctrine long after Lochner had been repudiated.
Also of significance, twentieth-century courts extended the
doctrine beyond rates to include other terms and conditions in
approved tariffs. 38 Since tariffs often regulate not only the price of
service but also its terms and conditions, the filed tariff doctrine's
801 (1999) (examining regulatory policy and critiquing the SidaklSpulber argument); Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1460-61
(2000) (discussing Sidak's and Spulber's arguments); Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory
Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998) (criticizing the Sidak/Spulber approach to regulatory
takings). These works criticize the protection of regulatory commitments based on constitutional
property norms, an argument advanced by Sidak and Spulber. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note
27.
35. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(requiring courts to give deference to administrative interpretations if the plain meaning of the
statute is ambiguous and the administrative interpretation is reasonable); infra note 70.
Chevron presumptively applies to interpretations adopted through notice and comment
rulemaking and formal adjudication. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001). In informal adjudication, where many tariffs are adopted, its application is more
questionable, see id. at 234-35, but courts routinely uphold agency tariffs under a strong
deference doctrine, perhaps because these agency decisions more likely involve complex issues of
policy rather than pure issues of law.
36. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1951).
37. Id.
38. See N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1963) ("[O]ur inquiry
is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms with prices or volumes of purchases.").
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scope eventually expanded to allow the entire regulatory process to
produce decisions that have the force and effect of a contract (and
arguably even property) in courts.8 9 Inevitably, as is discussed below,
this influences the behavior of regulated firms, since to invoke the
shield a firm is first required to divulge information to regulators.
B. The Filed Tariff Doctrine in the Context of the Institutional
Structure of Regulation
The unjust discrimination strand of the filed tariff doctrine is
steeped in progressive, consumer protection rhetoric. Compared to
these lofty aspirations, the doctrine's reality is grim: It echoes other
Lochner-era doctrines by serving as a shield for regulated firms and
enhancing regulatory commitments. However, given the nature of
regulation in the United States, the filed tariff doctrine has two other
strands. Its origins and purposes are not based entirely in consumer
protection aspirations or the protection of regulatory commitments,
but also are ensconced in the institutional structure within which
regulation develops. In applying the doctrine, courts can avoid
conflicts between national government and state regulators (the
federal preemption strand) and promote judicial deference to agency
regulators (the deference strand).
1. The Federal Preemption Strand
Because the filed tariff shield evolved first as a doctrine of
federal courts, it is often invoked to bar state regulatory or common
law claims. 40 Thus, much as federal regulation preempts state
common law claims, 41 or admiralty law preempts state common law
tort claims, 42 the doctrine has the general effect of precluding state
law claims that might allow departures from the filed rate. Because
successful state suits would allow service rates and conditions to vary
across jurisdictions, the preclusive effect of the filed tariff doctrine
43
promotes uniformity in tariff rates, terms, and conditions.

39. See, e.g., Duke Energy Trading and Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.
2001) (applying filed rate doctrine to effectively allow terms and conditions of FERC-approved
tariffs to preempt state law claims).
40. See Ark.-La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 576-85 (1981).
41. See Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 859 (1995).
42. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917); see also Ernest A. Young,
Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 283 (1999).
43. In the electric power context, state regulators can set rates only for intrastate
transactions, and these transactions also are largely off limits to federal regulators. See Fed.
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The preemption origins of the filed tariff doctrine were
acknowledged by courts before the doctrine took on independent
status in the twentieth century. For example, in 1894 the Supreme
Court held that, even where regulators had not approved a tariff, a
rate limiting the liability of a telegraph company for erroneously
transmitted messages was valid as a contractual limit on liability, so
long as there was no willful misconduct or gross negligence. 44
Subsequently, in evaluating a rate that regulators had approved for
the same telegraph company, the Court concluded that the limitation
on liability was a part of the utility's filed rate. 45 The Court reasoned
that the telegraph company "could no more depart from [the
limitations of liability] than it could depart from the amount charged
46
for the service rendered."
This principle, along with the general prohibition of
discrimination in rates, was broadened to give even tariffs which did
not expressly limit liability preemptive effect over state law claims. In
1907, the Supreme Court applied this principle to common carriers,
precluding a shipper from seeking damages outside of an ICC
proceeding. 47 Even where customers had negotiated rates below the
tariff price, the filed tariff doctrine was held to bar discounts. In one
case, a passenger had negotiated a ticket with a railroad for a rate of
$49.50, although the published rate for the route was $78.65.48 After
discovering this error, the railroad sued the passenger for the
difference and the Supreme Court upheld an award against the

Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 271 (1976) (allowing the Federal Power
Commission to consider evidence of retail rates in reviewing a nondiscrimination challenge to
federally set wholesale rates, but also noting that "[t]he Commission has no power to prescribe
the rates for retail sales of power companies"); N. States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090, 1096
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding that FERC does not have the authority to regulate transmission for
retail customers in its efforts to develop competitive wholesale power markets). Conversely,
under the Supremacy Clause, states too are prohibited from regulating in ways that encroach
upon the authority of federal regulators. See Energy Producers Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
36 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that more restrictive California cogeneration
monitoring program is preempted by FERC's cogeneration compliance program). Thus, the filed
tariff doctrine reinforces the limited power of states to regulate the industry, applying similar
restrictions as those it imposes on state courts and common law doctrines. But the filed tariff
doctrine is not necessary to define these jurisdictional lines; federal preemption analysis suffices
for these purposes and also safeguards against private forum shopping. See discussion infra Part
V.A.
44. See Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 21-34 (1894).
45. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921).
46. Id. The court recognized, however, that in other contexts, such as those involving
common carriers, limitations on liability were unreasonable. Id. at 574 (citing Union Pac. R.R. v.
Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921)).
47. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
48. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 96 (1915).

2003]

LOWERING THE FILED TARIFF SHIELD

1607

passenger, declining to allow any deviation from the filed rate-even if
49
agreed to under state contract law principles.
The doctrine not only limits state common law claims; it also
narrows the jurisdiction of state regulators.
For instance, in
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, a case addressing the
scope of FERC's authority to regulate wholesale rates, the Supreme
Court noted:
[The] FERC clearly has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged Nantahala's
interstate wholesale customers. Once [the] FERC sets such a rate, a State may not
conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale rates are
unreasonable. A State must rather give effect to Congress' desire to give [the] FERC
plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States do not
50
interfere with this authority.

The doctrine, for example, precludes a state from "trapping" costs by
exercising its "undoubted jurisdiction over retail rates to prevent the
wholesaler-as-seller from recovering the costs of paying the FERCapproved rate. ' 51 The Pike County exception to this doctrine allows a
state to deny a utility the opportunity to recover costs incurred as a
result of buying power at FERC-established wholesale rates if the
specific purchase, apart from the rate that was paid, is deemed
imprudent. 52 Although the United States Supreme Court has never
squarely held that imprudence is an escape hatch from the filed tariff
54
doctrine, many circuit and district courts, 53 as well as the FERC,
recognize the exception.
More recently, in AT&T v. Central Office Telephone Co., the
Supreme Court held that the tariff filing provisions of the Federal
Communications Act, modeled after the nondiscrimination provisions
of the ICA, require judicial enforcement of filed rates. 55 AT&T had
49. See id. at 94, 97.
50. 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 970.
52. Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 735, 737-38 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983).
53. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 373-74 (1988) and Nantahala, 476 U.S. at
972); Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 600, 609 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Regarding
the states' traditional power to consider the prudence of a retailer's purchasing decision in
setting retail rates, we find no reason why utilities must be permitted to recover costs that are
imprudently incurred."). But see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1049-50
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (declining to apply the exception because a decision on the permissibility of a
prudence review was not "meaningful" at the time of the decision).
54. See Palisades Generating Co., 48 F.E.R.C. 61,144, at 61,574 n.10 (1989) (noting that
FERC's action in accepting a tariff filing does not preempt or otherwise effect state jurisdiction to
review for prudence (citing Pa. Power & Light Co., 23 F.E.R.C. 61,325, 61,716 (1983) and
Monongahela Power Co., 39 F.E.R.C. 61,350, 62,095-96 (1987))).
55. 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998).
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entered into a contract to sell long-distance service to a reseller, giving
the reseller sufficient assurances to procure customers. Later, AT&T
experienced problems with its network, including delays and mistakes
in billing. 56 When the reseller was unable to meet its usage
commitments to AT&T, AT&T terminated its service eighteen months
prior to the end of the contract. 57 The reseller sued AT&T under state
law for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract.
AT&T mistakenly billed the reseller's customers, causing substantial
damage to the reseller, but AT&T also had tariffs on file with the FCC
58
specifically addressing some of the same subjects of the discounts.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that "[r]egardless of
the carrier's motive-whether it seeks to benefit or harm a particular
customer-the policy of nondiscriminatory rates is violated when
similarly situated customers pay different rates for the same services.
It is that antidiscriminatory policy which lies at 'the heart of the
common-carrier section of the Communications Act."' 59 Since Section
203(a) of the FCA required each common carrier to file tariffs with the
FCC, the Court was compelled to enforce the tariff and "[t]he rights as
defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or
'
tort of the carrier. "60
Following the Court's application of the filed tariff shield in
AT&T, wholesale customers of long-distance service face a serious loss
of remedy, and thus have scant means to deter wrongdoing by long
distance carriers. For example, assume that a carrier enters into a
56. Id. at 218-19.
57. Id. at 220.
58. See id. at 219-20. Although some of the services were within the scope of the tariff,
Central Office also claimed "that AT&T failed to provide untariffed services and engaged in
willful misconduct, and therefore, the filed-rate doctrine does not apply and its claims are not
preempted." Cent. Office Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 108 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 1997). Justice Scalia's
majority opinion rejected this argument, drawing on several previous cases that had invalidated
contracts that were at odds with the terms of filed tariffs in the ICC context. See AT&T, 524
U.S. at 224; Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560, 562 (1924) (invalidating the carrier's agreement to
provide the shipper with a number of railroad cars on a specified day, and stating that such a
special advantage "is illegal, when not provided for in the tariff"); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Kirby,
225 U.S. 155, 163, 165 (1912) (rejecting a shipper's breach-of-contract claim against a railroad for
failure to ship a carload of race horses by a particularly fast train, and holding that the contract
was invalid as a matter of law because the carrier's tariffs "did not provide for an expedited
service, nor for transportation by any particular train," and therefore the shipper received "an
undue advantage.., that it is not one open to all others in the same situation."); see also Kansas
City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 653 (1913) (noting that a carrier cannot "legally contract with a
particular shipper for an unusual service unless he makes and publishes a rate for such a
service."); Wight v. United States, 167 U.S. 512, 517-18 (1897) (prohibiting a railroad from giving
a rebate to a shipper to induce him to use their line).
59. See AT&T, 524 U.S. at 223 (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 229
(1994)).
60. Id. at 227 (quoting Keogh v. Chi. & Northwestern R.R., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922)).
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contract promising a reseller a rate of 5 cents per minute for
nationwide domestic switched terminations. 61 In return for this rate,
the reseller commits to purchase a million minutes per month over a
period of three years. 62 The reseller then enters into agreements with
third parties to resell service for 6 cents per minute. 63 However, due
to the negligence or fraudulent intent of the carrier, the underlying
carrier's filed tariffs contain a 10 cent rate, rather than the 5 cent
promised rate. 64 By law, the carrier is required to charge the reseller
the 10 cent rate, even though this would require the reseller to sell to
third parties below cost. 65 If the reseller remains liable to the carrier
66
over the full three year contract, its losses could be substantial.
The logic behind allowing a filed tariff to have an automatically
preemptive effect against all state law claims for money damages is
questionable. Allowing tort and contract claims to proceed to the
stage of damages does not necessarily result in discounts or
adjustments to rates that violate the general principle of
nondiscrimination in rates. Modern civil procedure-in particular, the
availability of class actions-makes uniform relief more likely. In the
Second Circuit's decision in Square D v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureau, Inc., the most sustained critique of the filed rate doctrine
penned from the bench, Judge Friendly observed that consumers can
(and, given lower net rates if successful in litigation, will face
incentives to) band together to bring class actions for breach of
contract, tort or fraud claims. To the extent that they do so, uniform
relief among classes is more likely today than it would have been in
the early twentieth century. 67 If appropriately structured, these class
actions hold promise to minimize monopolistic abuses in pricing. 68
61. Neil S. Ende, Unholy Contract: The Legacy and Abuse of the Filed Rate Doctrine,
PHONE+, May 1999, http://www.phoneplusmag.com/articles/951feat3.html.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1352 (2d Cir.
1985), affd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986). Elsewhere Judge Friendly and others have urged an expansive
role for the federal judiciary in implementing regulatory programs. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly,
In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964)
(claiming that Erie "opened the way" for development of "specialized federal common law"); Paul
J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 799-800 (1957) (suggesting that
the federal judiciary must be competent to declare law for proper implementation of
congressional programs). Judge Friendly's revisiting of the filed tariff doctrine might be
understood within this context that Mishkin discusses.
68. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1086-87 (2002)
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Apart from general reference to the principles of nondiscrimination
and uniformity, courts never fully explained why the filed rate
doctrine requires preemption of state law contract, tort, and fraud
claims. Independent of federal preemption law principles, however,
the filed tariff doctrine rings hollow as an analytical basis for
concluding that federal regulation has a preemptive effect on state
regulation or a state law claim.
2. The Agency Deference Strand
Also ensconced in the history of the filed tariff doctrine is a
strong tradition of judicial deference to agency regulators. 69 Even
where federal law, such as the various doctrines of antitrust law,
might provide a workable legal standard for evaluating the conduct of
regulated firms, courts may invoke the filed tariff doctrine to bar
jurisdiction over a claim. As such, the filed rate doctrine serves a
function similar to Chevron deference: 70 out of respect for the expertise
of agency regulators (as well as in the interests of promoting judicial
economy and national uniformity), courts sometimes refuse to
71
entertain the legal merits of a dispute related to an agency tariff.
While the Supreme Court has stated that there is no general
across-the-board antitrust immunity for transactions approved by
regulators, 72 direct antitrust attacks to regulated rates and other
terms and conditions have long been limited by the filed rate
doctrine.73 In the classic case on the issue, Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Co., the Court held that a private plaintiff

(discussing class action consumer cases and proposing a common currency for purposes of
minimizing principal/agent problems during settlement).
69. See infra note 73.
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (finding
that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer"). For further discussion of broader Chevron
aspects of the filed tariff doctrine, particularly the tension inherent in its judicial application, see
infra Part W.A.
71. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
72. See California v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 490 (1962) (holding that the
Federal Power Commission could not approve a merger application when an antitrust suit was
pending in court regarding the same merger).
73. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 375 (1988)
(finding "the reasonableness of rates and agreements regulated by FERC may not be collaterally
attacked in state or federal court"); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476
U.S. 409, 423-24 (1956) (upholding the rule from Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S.
156 (1922), that a private shipper cannot recover treble damages under the Sherman Act in
connection with filed tariffs); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966
(1986) (holding that "a State may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved
wholesale rates are unreasonable").
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cannot recover treble damages against a carrier based on the claim
that a tariff rate filed with the ICC was allegedly monopolistic. 74
Writing for the Court, Justice
Brandeis emphasized the
nondiscrimination principle, 75 but also grounded his decision in
respect for an ongoing agency regulatory process. As he observed, the
need for an antitrust remedy is questionable, given that section eight
of the ICA gave shippers injured by illegal rates actual damages plus
attorneys fees. 76 In addition, since an award of antitrust damages
would depend on proof that the rate in fact paid exceeds the rate that
would have prevailed in a competitive market (hypothetically, of
course), this hypothetical rate would also have been approved by the
ICC. Thus, Justice Brandeis reasoned, what the agency would have
approved is a question better determined by the agency than the
courts.

77

A common, if controversial, example of the filed tariff doctrine's
continued impact involves the traditional price squeeze scenario, in
which a monopolist defendant supplies a plaintiff at wholesale (for
resale), yet competes with the plaintiff at the retail level. The typical
price squeeze claim is that the defendant engaged in illegal conduct by
setting out to destroy the plaintiff by inflating the wholesale price to
the plaintiff while artificially depressing the retail price to shared
customers. Some courts have rejected a filed rate defense in the
context where a monopolist supplier is subject to federal regulation at
the wholesale level but not at the retail level, 78 because federal
regulators would not necessarily be responsible for evaluating retail
rates. 79 Where a federal agency regulates both of the rates in

74. 260 U.S. 156, 163-65 (1922).
75. Id. at 163 (noting that the filed rate is legal for all purposes and is not to be "varied or
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier").
76. Id. at 162.
77.

Id. at 163-64.

78. See City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding
that "courts may consider a price-squeeze claim without infringing on the regulatory jurisdiction
of the FERC and PSC, because the question is not whether the rates themselves are anticompetitive, but whether the defendant utility acted illegally in proposing a certain anticompetitive combination of rates"); City of Mishawaka v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314,
1321-22 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Federal Power Commission does not have exclusive or
primary jurisdiction over an antitrust claim). But see Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915
F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (reaching the same result as the filed rate doctrine based on an analysis
similar to assessment of state action immunity at the state level).
79. As one commentator explains:
The most effective way of eliminating all harmful price squeezes would be to place
jurisdiction over both retail and wholesale service in a single agency. Not only is dual
regulation directly responsible for those squeezes produced by regulatory
inconsistency, it is indirectly responsible for those caused by deliberate utility
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question, however, courts have more consistently invoked the filed
rate doctrine as a bar to price squeeze antitrust claims brought by
consumers.8 0 For similar reasons, courts refuse to apply the filed
tariff doctrine to claims for injunctive relief where an agency lacks
injunctive authority. 81 Courts justify invocation of the filed rate shield
from antitrust liability as a type of deference to agency regulators.
The deference strand of the doctrine is limited by the doctrine's
primary and original purpose-protecting consumers from price
discrimination.
Courts generally refuse to apply the filed tariff
doctrine to claims brought by competitors, since there is no real
consumer to protect. 82 For example, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court refused to apply the filed
tariff doctrine to bar essential facilities claims by competitors because
the court perceived only "a potential conflict" with FERC's authority
over transmission. 83 The Ninth Circuit has more explicitly recognized
84
an exception to the doctrine for cases involving competitors.

conduct. The latter variety, in essence, are possible because the utility may be able to
manipulate the regulatory process.
John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of Action, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 563, 638-39 (1984).
80. See Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 419-20 (1st Cir. 2000)
(recognizing the controversial nature of a filed rate bar and applying it to an antitrust claim).
81. For discussion of how the remedy should influence application of the shield, see Note,
The Sherman Act as Applied to Railroads Regulated Under the Interstate Commerce Act, 36
HARV. L. REV. 456, 459-60 (1923) (arguing that the bar of Keogh should not apply to equitable
remedies, such as injunctions, under the Sherman Act); Recent Case, Primary Jurisdiction
Applied in Action Against Members of Regulated Industry, 101 PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1953)
(observing that "reason to withhold total relief should not compel withholding partial relief.., in
the form of an injunction...").
82. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, IA ANTITRUST LAW
247c, at 108-09
(2d ed. 2000). Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest that most courts have limited filed rate immunity
from antitrust claims to suits brought by purchasers, often referred to as "overcharge" claims,
and note that claims by competitors, based on lost profits rather than the claim that the
competitor paid too much, have been more successful in overcoming the filed tariff shield. They
further find that because an award of damages to a competitor (if the competitor is not also a
wholesale or retail customer) does not risk discrimination to consumers, at least some of the
rationales of Keogh do not apply. This distinction is not easy to apply in the real world, since
frequently competitors are consumers, as often holds true in the context of wholesale markets.
83. 410 U.S. 376, 377 (1973).
84. See Cost Mgmt. Servs. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 944.45 (9th Cir. 1996)
(endorsing an earlier version of AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 82); Barnes v. Arden
Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1985). In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish
between a competitor and a consumer. For example, wholesale customers of utilities are
frequently also competitors. The competitor exception is ambiguous about how courts should
treat claims by a competitor who is also a consumer. A Sixth Circuit case rejects the competitor
exception to the filed tariff doctrine. See Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn. Cent. Corp., 838
F.2d 1445, 1455-57 (6th Cir. 1988).
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Consistent with the doctrine's nondiscrimination strand, some
states have adopted their own state-law equivalent to the federal filed
tariff shield, even though the filed rate doctrine is predominantly a
principle that applies in federal courts.8 5 A filed tariff has a preclusive
effect on consumer, tort, fraud and even antitrust litigation in several
states. 86 Other states, however, do not recognize as expansive a filed
tariff doctrine for purposes of state law.8 7 States that recognize the
filed rate doctrine embrace it primarily out of deference to agency
88
regulators.
While courts commonly embrace deference as a goal of the filed
tariff doctrine, this strand of the doctrine is also based on overbroad
premises. Reluctantly invoking the doctrine to bar an antitrust claim,
Judge Friendly observed in Square D that an award of antitrust
damages (just as an award of money damages in common law claims)
does not necessarily force a particular rate on an agency such as the
ICC.89 Instead, even if a court awards judgment to the plaintiff, an
agency retains discretion to accept or reject this as a reasonable cost
It may be necessary to make
associated with the activity. 90
adjustments in a later rate case, but this is a decision for an agency,
not a court. Thus, even before widespread availability of consumer
class actions, the threat of money damages enforced by courts served
the effect of deterring wrongdoing by utilities without necessarily
stepping on the toes of regulators. If damages are awarded against a
85. See, e.g., cases cited supranotes 6-8, 12, 15-17, 45, 50, 62, 69-70, 76.
86. See, e.g., Teleconnect Co. v. U.S. W. Communications, 508 N.W.2d 644, 648-49 (Iowa
1993) (invoking state-created filed rate doctrine); N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat'l Council on
Compensation Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 372-73 (N.C. 1998) (adopting filed rate under North Carolina
law to preclude judicial consideration of complaint that insurers withheld information from
regulators, thus forcing plaintiffs to pay more for insurance); Satellite Sys., Inc. v. Birch Telecom.
of Okla., Inc., 51 P.3d 585, 587-88 (Okla. 2002) (adopting filed rate doctrine as a matter of state
law, but recognizing an exception for fraud); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d
211, 216-17 (Tex. 2002) (invoking filed rate doctrine to bar negligence claim against utility);
Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 661-63 (Wis. 1993) (applying filed rate
doctrine under state law).
87. See, e.g., Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Communications Group, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 398
(2001) (noting limits in California's filed rate doctrine); Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court, 14
Cal. App. 4th 1224 (1993) (holding that the filed rate doctrine is not a bar to antitrust claims
under California state law).
88. See Satellite Sys., Inc., 51 P.3d at 588 (recognizing purposes behind Oklahoma's
adoption of doctrine as "to prevent discriminatory rates and to vest an agency with authority to
set reasonable rates"); Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio v. Nat'l Council on Compensation Ins.,
Inc., 988 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) ('The filed rate doctrine stands for the proposition
that because an administrative agency is vested with the authority to determine what rate is
just and reasonable, courts should not adjudicate what a reasonable rate might be in a collateral
lawsuit.").
89. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1352 (2d Cir. 1985)
90. See id. at 1353.
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utility for its illegal conduct, then the regulated firm itself needs to
decide whether to absorb the loss and pass it on to shareholders, or to
attempt to pass it on to customers through regulated rates. But, by
assessing monetary damages, courts do not force this determination
onto regulators. Instead, under cost-of-service regulation, only once
federal regulators find the conduct leading to damages in judicial
proceedings "prudent" are utilities allowed to recover the costs
associated with the conduct. 91 Prudence remains an independent
finding within the expert judgment of regulators, not courts, and
regulators retain the complete authority to make adjustments to the
regulated firm's rates in future cases, as reasonableness demands. 92
In Square D, Judge Friendly also observed that in many
contexts treble damage remedies are permitted even where regulatory
remedies are already available, 93 and that rules of procedure have
developed to allow judicial proceedings to be stayed pending the
outcome of agency procedures. 94 Since regulators are not coerced by
courts to accept changes to the rate and courts have at their disposal
other tools for respecting deference, 9 the filed tariff doctrine is hardly
necessary to protect agency discretion.
On appeal of Judge Friendly's Square D decision to the United
States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, writing for a majority,
acknowledged that the case at hand could be distinguished from
Keogh, in that the tariffs at issue were not subject to an ICC hearing
prior to going into effect, but instead were merely filed with the
agency. 96
However, noting the "established guidepost" of the
longstanding filed tariff doctrine, the Supreme Court also upheld the
filed tariff bar. 97
According to Justice Stevens, the various
developments mentioned by Judge Friendly "seem to undermine some
of the reasoning in Justice Brandeis' Keogh opinion." 98 Nonetheless, in
Square D the Court followed Keogh, noting that the reasoning of

91.

See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 340-42 (3d ed. 1993)

(discussing the prudence standard).
92. See id. (providing examples of adjustments).
93. See Square D, 760 F.2d at 1354 (noting that "[t]he Court has subsequently found that
activity could be challenged under the antitrust laws despite the existence of an administrative
agency with authority to regulate the activity").
94. See id. at 1353 (contrasting "the many later cases in which the Supreme Court has
directed the suspension of judicial proceedings pending the referral of similar issues to the ICC"
with Keogh's concern about the need for the ICC to determine rates). For further discussion, see
discussion of primary jurisdiction infra Part V.B. 1.
95. As are discussed infra Part V.
96. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417 (1986).
97. Id. at 423.
98.

Id.
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Judge Friendly's "characteristically thoughtful and incisive opinion" 99
did not "overcome the strong presumption of continued validity that
adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute."10 0 The Court
failed, however, to come to grips with the tension in the deference
rationale for the filed tariff doctrine. Given the preservation of agency
discretion to change rates, as well as an agency regulatory process
that often fails to carefully examine rates, respect for agency deference
alone simply cannot justify the filed tariff doctrine's continuation.
The filed tariff doctrine has had an enormous effect on the
development of twentieth century regulatory law, but its application is
not always automatic. When courts apply it, they are often careful to
avoid extension of the doctrine to cases involving competitors or cases
seeking injunctions against firms where the regulator itself lacks such
remedy. Courts have also created an exception for claims of price
squeeze where regulators lack jurisdiction to remedy allegedly illegal
conduct. Even outside of these exceptions, however, the filed tariff
doctrine is unnecessary, and sometimes unsuccessful in achieving its
major purposes, as revealed in its unjust discrimination, federal
preemption and deference strands. Despite these doctrinal faults, the
filed tariff shield was strongly endorsed and applied by courts during
the era of traditional utility regulation.
III.

REASSESSING BATTLE STRATEGY

The filed tariff shield not only influences the course of
litigation, but also affects the behavior of private firms and agencies in
the regulatory process. Institutionally, agencies and courts have
never been very effective at monitoring tariffing as a private forumshopping strategy. With the introduction of competition to formerly
regulated industries, market norms are emerging to expose a gap in
regulatory agency ability to deter wrongdoing by private firms. To the
extent the filed tariff doctrine encourages strategic manipulation of
the tariffing process to foreclose judicial enforcement, it widens this
gap and may even result in more radical deregulation than either
Congress or agencies intend.
A. The Influence of the Shield on Institutional Choice
In addition to its doctrinal shortcomings, the filed tariff shield
affects the behavior of both regulated firms and regulators in ways

99. Id.
100. Id. at 424.
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that pose hidden, but sometimes significant, social welfare costs for
the regulatory process. In assessing the effects of the shield, it is
important to focus on the behavior of private firms, regulators, and
courts. For purposes of conceptualizing the basic effects of the
doctrine, a few simplifying observations about the behavior of these
actors are in order. First, assume that a private firm is motivated by
its ability to avoid substantial penalties for its market decisions (along
with other goals, such as maximizing profits). Next, assume that an
agency is motivated by sustaining and expanding its jurisdiction
(among other goals, perhaps even including regulating in the public
interest). Finally, assume that reviewing courts are concerned with
sustaining their independence and institutional posture (along with
other goals, perhaps even including promoting sound governance by
other branches of government, as deference to an agency might
reinforce).
.Against the backdrop of these various actors, the issue of
regulation can be understood through the lens of institutional
choice. 10 1 When managing an industry, such as electric power, three
main institutional fora are available. First, and most prevalent
throughout the twentieth century, regulatory agencies (federal or
state) can set prices, structure, and service terms and conditions for
firms in an industry. 10 2 Second, courts can regulate structure and
service terms and conditions in an industry through the application of
statutory standards, such as the antitrust laws, and common law
doctrines (including the law of fraud and contract). 10 3
Third,
spontaneous ordering of the market can regulate the prices, structure,
and service terms and conditions in an industry. 10 4 Of course, in most
industries, some mixture of these three options regulates the conduct
of private firms. For instance, in most unregulated industries, a mix
of the second and third options serves to govern private behavior:
prices are determined through the market, but courts also apply

101. This analysis thus draws on the insights of neo-institutional economics.

For a good

survey, see EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1998) and OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).

102. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1325 (describing the "original paradigm," in
which regulators monitored entry and exit and set prices based on cost of service); id. at 1365-69
(discussing role of agencies in managing industry structure).
103. See id. at 1369-77 (describing role of courts as a catalyst for change and arbiter of
regulatory structure).
104. See id. at 1383-1403 (acknowledging that no one institution of government is the
primary architect of regulatory ordering, and discussing "deep-seated economic and social forces"
which have contributed to regulatory change and structure).
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antitrust laws and common law doctrines in order to enhance overall
social welfare in a competitive marketplace.
By contrast, in the context of twentieth century natural
monopoly regulation, industry governance banked most of its promise
on the institutional choice of the regulatory agency. 106 The other
approaches-courts and competitive markets-were largely ignored.
Focusing on how the regulatory agency affects private conduct, public
choice theorists 106 and other economists 10 7 have chronicled the
potential problems of the agency-dominated approach to managing
regulatory problems.
Most of this literature, however, cynically
attributes any adverse welfare consequence of this regulatory process
to regulation itself.10 8
Under-acknowledged in the literature is the impact of specific
legal rules, such as the filed tariff doctrine, on the successes or failures
of the regulatory process. Recently, however, political scientists and
economists have begun to analyze how interest groups, including
regulated firms, decide to allocate their resources between various
types of regulation, congressional, agency, or judicial. 10 9 A worthy
candidate for similar analysis, the filed tariff doctrine has serious and
unique implications for the behavior of regulated firms. Since the
doctrine is only available on a widespread basis if a utility has filed its
tariff with federal regulators, the doctrine creates an incentive for
private firms, such as regulated utilities, to invest more heavily than
otherwise in lobbying regulators ex ante to accept or approve tariffs.
By engaging in such conduct ex ante, firms avoid the uncertainty of ex
post judicial enforcement. The doctrine thus encourages a type of
forum shopping, triggered primarily by private decisions to provide
information in the regulatory process. If a private firm desires the
105. See id. at 1325 (discussing agency rate regulation).
106. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) (presenting a theory of competition analysis of
pressure groups vying for political influence); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) (analyzing theory of regulation from a "producer
protection" view); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971)
(creating a theory of regulation that shows demand for regulation and supply of regulation based
on analysis of public resources, political power, political process, and economic groups).
107. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 21 (2002) (discussing
incentives for ex ante behavior in the regulatory relationship).
108. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE 23-25 (1997) (discussing the
cynical turn in public choice theory); ROGER NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: STUDIES IN THE
REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (Brookings 1971).
109. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin et al., Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by RentSeekers, 107 PUB. CHOICE 295 (2001); JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO & RuI J.P. DE FIGUEIREDO, JR.,
THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BY INTEREST GROUPS: LOBBYING, LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper
No. 364, Apr. 2002), www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/ 364.pdf.
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protection of the shield-immunity from state and antitrust law suits
for its market behavior-it has a strong incentive to divulge
information to regulators ex ante, in anticipation that this information
will be included in published tariffs and will minimize unpredictable,
ex post judicial meddling.
As a matter of regulatory theory, additional information is
generally regarded as a positive good for the regulatory process. 110
Additional information for regulators has proved helpful to regulators
as they determine and monitor cost-of-service rates and related terms
and conditions. The filed tariff doctrine is consistent with a view of
regulation based on active monitoring of an industry by regulators.
Information is seen as a necessary good for regulators to perform their
assigned tasks. More information improves the regulatory climate to
the extent that it allows regulators to sort through issues and
problems while also acting as a check, of sorts, on capture of the
agency.'
At the same time, however, the filed tariff shield encourages
regulated firms to strategically divulge information unrelated to the
anticipated regulatory actions of the state. For instance, a tariff filed
with FERC may include information regarding transmission and
distribution activities over which federal and state regulators have
concurrent potential jurisdiction, but which neither federal or state
regulators may choose to regulate. Blanket application of the filed
tariff doctrine would create a regulatory gap, in which both regulators
and courts do not attempt to evaluate conduct. Where there is no
check on the accuracy and relevance of the information submitted in
the regulatory process, opportunities for manipulation of regulationand in particular institutional choice-are present. 112 To the extent
regulated firms engage in such conduct ex ante, an institutional bias
in favor of regulatory agencies, and away from courts and markets, is
likely to result.
The prospect of strategic over-divulgence of
information-as well as more affirmative rent seeking as firms lobby
regulators to include in tariffs terms and conditions unrelated to
110. For general discussion of how information can be a positive good in this regard, see Jim
Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 185-87 (1997).
111. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of
Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 284-85 (1984).
112. Using more formal modeling, commentators warn of similar behavior in other
information-disclosure contexts. See, e.g., Tracy Lewis & Michael Poitevin, Disclosure of
Information in Regulatory Proceedings, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50 (1997) (mentioning examples of
drug approval and merger applications); Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175 (2000) (discussing intellectual property license
applications).
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expected regulatory action-presents a potential cost to be balanced
against the information provision incentives created by the filed tariff
doctrine. In the context of asymmetric information disclosure of nonverifiable information in contractual bargaining, Professor Eric Talley
113
has observed a need for judicial monitoring or verification.
Similarly, at a minimum, there is a need for increased judicial
intervention in monitoring the application of filed tariff, although in
considering the role of such judicial monitoring, I ultimately conclude
that the filed tariff doctrine is wholly unnecessary, given other
114
doctrines available to courts.
In other legal contexts, safeguards are in place to protect the
public interest from the adverse institutional implications of overdisclosure of information ex ante to manipulate ex post enforcement.
Elsewhere, the balance between disclosure, on the one hand, and
institutional decisions to regulate, on the other, is monitored by the
oversight of a third party who has the ability to protect the public
interest. For example, in the context of securities regulation and
witness immunity from criminal prosecution, each of which rely on
information disclosure to make a regulatory choice, third party
oversight plays an important role in monitoring the divulgence of
information to ensure that the choice is welfare enhancing.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in its
regulations, requires companies to disclose the risks associated with
their investments, but does not allow disclosure of these risks to
preclude agency enforcement proceedings against companies." 5 In
fact, disclosure of information may spur the SEC to take enforcement
action against companies. The regulations of the SEC envision the
agency itself, as well as courts, monitoring such information disclosure
to ensure that it is not materially misleading (or reckless), and
thereby does not have a negative effect on the operation of securities
markets." 6 Thus, the agency evaluates the appropriateness of
disclosure to ensure that the effects on the market are not adverse.

113. See Eric Talley, DisclosureNorms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1992-93 (2001).
114. See discussion infra Part V.
115. Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003), private causes of action are
available against companies where "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the
misstatement or omission of a material fact, made with scienter, upon which the plaintiff
justifiably relied and which proximately caused the plaintiffs injury." See In re Comshare, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
116. See In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d at 548; Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of
Materiality and Recklessness in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 55 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1033 (2000)
(arguing that in order to assess whether a defendant acted recklessly in failing to disclose facts a
court should consider "whether the defendant knew that the facts were material").
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Disclosure also plays an important role in influencing
institutional choice in the criminal procedure context. Prosecutors
routinely provide incentives for disclosure by witnesses by offering
immunity in exchange for disclosure. Where federal prosecutors offer
immunity in exchange for disclosure, however, the prosecutor must
determine that immunity is "in the public interest," and a judge must
approve the grant of immunity. 1 17 The specific determination that the
public interest is served by the prosecutor, along with independent
approval by the judge, serves a third-party monitoring role, helping to
ensure that the institutional choice influenced by disclosure does not
thwart social welfare.
In the context of many price-regulated industries, however,
third-party monitoring of strategic disclosure is ineffective. Thirdparty monitoring of information disclosure in the utility regulation
context depends on the actions of either regulators, as in the context of
the SEC, or courts, as in the context of criminal immunity. To the
extent that the filed tariff shield applies, however, both regulators and
courts are ineffective at policing this balance ex ante to ensure that
the application of the shield is not harmful to social welfare ex post.
A regulatory agency will hardly be opposed to gaining new
information from the firms it regulates, particularly since the
submission of tariff terms and conditions invites the prospect of future
expansion of agency jurisdiction. Since regulatory agencies have
limited resources to allocate to monitoring, in most instances agencies
are required to acquiesce in, rather than refuse, tariff filings. In some
instances, filed tariffs become effective by operation of law after the
passage of time, with little or no scrutiny by agencies. 1 " So the filed
tariff bar curiously aligns the incentives of both private firms and
regulators to include as many terms and conditions as possible in
tariffs-even when these terms and conditions are sham, in the sense
that agencies often lack the power to seriously enforce them.
Courts are likewise ineffective at monitoring the costs
associated with the filed tariff bar. To the extent the interests of
regulators and firms align in the direction of expansive tariffs, judicial
appeals rarely, if ever, may focus on the appropriateness of inclusion
of information in a tariff. When tariffs are appealed on other grounds,
courts are highly inclined to uphold tariffs under general principles of

117. See, e.g., Leonard N. Sosnov, Separation of Powers Shell Game: The Federal Witness
Immunity Act, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 183-84 (2000) (describing the respective roles of the judge
and prosecutor under the Federal Witness Immunity Act).
118. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (2000) (allowing proposed changes to FERC tariffs to go
into effect after a 5-month period).
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deference to agency regulators. 1 9
Indeed, given principles of
deference to agency regulators in the late twentieth century, 120 the
judiciary has played very little role in policing private behavior in the
tariffing process and its relationship to the filed tariff shield. Since
the interests of regulators and firms converge, and courts have little
institutional capacity to police the bargains and information reflected
in tariffs, there are no effective safeguards against strategic use of the
regulatory process to forum shop.
B. The Enforcement Gap in the New Tariffing Environment
Private forum shopping bias in the direction of the agency
regulator does not present an enforcement problem if federal
regulators fully evaluate tariffs prior to approval and have the
jurisdiction and resources to adequately deter market abuses.
However, changes in the regulatory approach to tariffing, along with
limited agency jurisdiction and resources, substantially undermine the
agency regulator's ability to deter market abuses. Thus, the forum
shopping bias of the filed tariff doctrine can result in more radical
deregulation-markets absent even antitrust or common law
enforcement-than either Congress or agencies would prefer.
With deregulation of electric power and other traditionally
regulated industries, tariffing is no longer a process in which the
approval of a rate imposes firm-specific terms, such as prices. Instead,
tariffing has become a process for holding firms to market
expectations regarding industry structure, particularly network
121
access, and for providing information to competitors and consumers.
Tariffs, along with agency regulations, increasingly set general
standards for the operation of a competitive market. In contrast to
cost-of-service regulation, "[u]nder the new paradigm, the regulator
plays a far more limited role. Instead of comprehensively overseeing
an industry in order to protect the end-user, its principal function is to
maximize competition among rival providers, in the expectation that
22
competition will provide all the protection necessary for end-users."'
119. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1369 (acknowledging that courts routinely act in a
review capacity); see, e.g., Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and "Takings," 19 ENERGY L.J. 241,
243 (1989) (noting that the balance struck by regulators in tariffs is subject to judicial deference);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Pubic Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police
the PoliticalInstitutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 20310, 1046 (1989) (observing that the judiciary lacks the
institutional capacity to engage in review of ratemaking).
120. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
121. See Gerald Norlander, May FERC Rely on Markets to Set Electric Rates?, 24 ENERGY
L.J. 65 (2003) (describing the general trend).
122. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1361.
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In light of recent problems with deregulated markets, particularly
well-publicized problems with deregulation of electric power,1 23 this
account seems to glorify the promise of competition. Nevertheless, it
aptly describes the approach federal regulators have taken in
restructuring public utility industries, such as electric power and
telecommunications. As one former FERC Commissioner has stated:
The new prevailing theory for disclosure is that where an industry is competitive,
consumers are better served by the results of working market processes. Consequently,
the focus of regulatory reporting and disclosure obligations should shift from what is
needed for setting cost-based rates to what is needed for maintaining a competitive
124
market and preventing an individual competitor from exercising market power.

Regulators increasingly announce their approach through generally
applicable rules-not in firm-specific tariff filings. 125 To the extent
that regulators continue to address firm-specific information in tariffs,
they are predominantly concerned with industry structure and market
information disclosure, rather than protecting consumers from price
126
discrimination in the setting of firm-specific rates.
For example, in the context of electric power deregulation,
regulators have significantly relaxed the scope of their tariff filing
requirements. FERC's Order No. 888 deregulates wholesale electric
power markets and promotes competition in electric power supply by
requiring each utility to file a standard form ("pro forma") open access
transmission tariff, subject to FERC's approval.1 2 7 FERC's jurisdiction
is limited to wholesale transactions, so these tariffs primarily govern
the relationships between utilities and other utilities and wholesale
suppliers, not utilities and retail customers. 128 Each utility is required
to file its own standard form transmission service tariff. 129 For some
utilities, who voluntarily turned management of their transmission
123. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding
California'sRestructuringDisaster, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at 191.
124. Donald F. Santa, Jr., Who Needs What, and Why? Reporting and Disclosure Obligations
in Emerging Competitive Electricity Markets, 21 ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
125. See Norlander, supra note 121.
126. A good example is a filing PG&E Corp. made with FERC, shielding millions of dollars in
unregulated assets from creditors when PG&E declared bankruptcy. See Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v.
FERC, 329 F.3d 700, 704-05 (2003); 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds FERC Order Blessing
Reorganization of PG&E Corp. to Create Corporate Shield for Credit-Hungry National Energy
Group, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., May 22, 2003, at 7, 2003 WL 9809692.
127. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080 (1996). As a part of its rule, FERC
provided the standard tariff, which it expected each transmitting utility to file. Id.
128. The scope of FERC's authority to regulate electricity markets was recently addressed by
the United States Supreme Court in New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2002) (noting FERC's
jurisdiction over wholesale sales under section 201 of the Federal Power Act).
129. 18 C.F.R. §§ 35.1, 385.205 (2003); 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080 (rule requiring all jurisdictional
utilities to file open access transmission tariffs).
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networks over to independent operators, FERC attempted to dispense
with its tariff filing requirement, instead allowing an Independent
Service Operator to file transmission tariffs on behalf of its members.
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that Section 205 of the Federal
Power Act requires FERC to allow each individual, jurisdictional
utility to file a tariff. 130 Thus, for the time being, FERC continues to
require the filing of transmission tariffs by individual utilities, subject
131
to its industry-wide open access policies.
At the same time, FERC's regulatory authority over utilities is
far from plenary. Although FERC would like to implement a uniform
national policy for transmission access and pricing,1 3 2 the scope of
FERC's legal authority over transmission is limited: FERC regulates
wholesale sales, but has no jurisdiction over retail transmission
sales. 133 This creates a jurisdictional gap which regulated utilities
might seek to fill by filing unenforceable, firm-specific tariff terms
with FERC. For example, a utility may file an open access tariff with
FERC, using this tariff filing to specify how it will treat its retail
customers in making transmission decisions; if a court is not careful
about its decision to apply the filed tariff doctrine, the treatment of
retail customers could then fall within the scope of a defense to
application of the antitrust laws. FERC does not have jurisdiction
over retail sales, however, so retail service could escape the scrutiny of
both FERC regulation and the antitrust laws in many instances. State
regulators may or may not have picked up the slack in addressing
retail sales, but courts would need to consider this all as well as the
scope of regulation under the federal tariff. FERC has significantly
moved away from cost-of-service rate regulation of both transmission
and bulk power supply;1 34 even in this context, however, FERC's
130. See Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Atlantic City does not
address the filed tariff doctrine, but instead focuses on a regulated utility's procedural right to
agency review and consideration of its tariff changes. See id. at 9-10. Even though the court held
that FERC could not dispense with these procedures, it also acknowledged that "FERC plays 'an
essentially passive and reactive' role under section 205." Id. at 10 (citing City of Winnfield v.
FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
131. It is unclear whether, and how, nondiscrimination will be protected in the context of
open access to bottleneck facilities. In the telecommunications context, Jean-Jacques Laffont
and Jean Tirole argue that the optimal access prices to bottleneck facilities are discriminatory,
since they are usage based. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 105-07 (2000) (noting conflict between usage-based pricing and
nondiscrimination provisions in United States and European legal regimes).
132. See Electric Shock, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2003, at A20, 2003 WL 62212314.
133. FERC, 535 U.S. at 22-23 (noting that states retain jurisdiction over retail sales, which
are outside of FERC's jurisdiction).
134. For instance, FERC has evolved its power supply jurisdiction from cost-of-service
ratemaking to so-called "market-based rates," for which FERC waives certain filing
requirements altogether. For discussion of FERC's early market-based rate filings, including its
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jurisdiction does not include retail sales. In contrast to wholesale
transmission and power supply sales, which are regulated by FERC,
the relationship between utilities and retail customers is largely
regulated at the state level, and many states continue to require the
filing and approval of tariffs governing power transmission and
distribution, if not supply. 135 As a result, the emergence of wholesale
competition at the federal level, along with differing-and sometimes
conflicting-approaches to deregulation at the state level (where state
law consumer protections become most relevant), has led to some of
the fiercest battles in the history of the electric power industry. 136
Like FERC, many other regulatory agencies maintain their
filing requirements in the current deregulatory environment, but
today these filings serve predominantly general market structure
functions, informational and evaluative, rather than firm-specific
right-creating functions. 137
Nondiscrimination, central to rate
regulation throughout the twentieth century, has evolved to
incorporate the general norms of consumer protection laws, including
notions of comparability.1 38 Yet this is a far more general standardaimed at defining network access and industry structure-than the
traditional unjust discrimination standard-which was adjudicated in
firm-specific cases. Put simply, in regulated industries the regulator
no longer perceives its role as monitoring firm-specific costs to
guarantee each customer the same rate.1 39 Further, as FERC's
exercise of jurisdiction exemplifies, with deregulation many agencies
have waived some or all of their jurisdictional filing requirements with
respect to entities that lack market power.140
Against this backdrop, use of the filed tariff shield to bar
consumer protection litigation in the context of deregulated
waiver of various jurisdictional requirements, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The
Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 799-801 (addressing the role of courts in reviewing final agency orders).
135. See supra note 133.

136. See discussion infra Part JV.B.
137. For a discussion of FERC, see Norlander, supra note 121. Other agencies moving in this
direction include the FCC. See Charles H. Helein et al., Detariffing and the Death of the Filed
Tariff Doctrine:Deregulatingin the "Self'Interest,54 FED. COMM. L.J. 281 (2002).
138. For example, under FERC's comparability standard: "an open access tariff that is not
unduly discriminatory or anticompetitive should offer third parties access on the same or
comparable basis, and under the same or comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission
provider's uses of its [own] system."' Alliant Energy Corp. v. FERC, 253 F.3d 748, 751 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (quoting Transmission Pricing Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,031, 55,034 (Nov. 3,
1994) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 2)).
139. Cf. LAFFONT & TIROLE, supra note 131, at 107 (arguing that usage-based pricing is a
"transposition of standard marketing techniques to a regulated firm").
140. See Norlander, supra note 121, at 73-75 (discussing market-based rates).
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telecommunications or electric power service is problematic.
Competitive markets will, as they have in the telecommunications
context, invite opportunities for service providers to offer discounts
and rebates to customers. As a principle of economics, flexibility in
pricing is key to effective operation of a competitive market. This
allows regulators more discretion in implementing competition policy.
More importantly, in the competitive environment it allows private
firms flexibility in pricing and service. Without flexibility, private
firms lack the ability to respond to market conditions, including
changes in supply and demand. As courts traditionally apply the filed
tariff doctrine, however, changes to prices are not allowed unless they
14
are specifically envisioned by a previously approved tariff. '
Even where a tariff does envision flexibility in pricing-as is
often intended for market-based rates-the filed tariff doctrine can
lead to problems. Because, under the filed tariff doctrine, service
providers are not bound (in any judicially enforceable way) to the
terms of contracts they have entered into with customers unless the
specific contracts have been approved by regulators, providers face no
disincentive for engaging in misrepresentation or even fraudulent
contracts in attempting to secure customers. In addition, consumer
suits under the antitrust laws, designed to protect and encourage
competition, are not allowed to reach the conduct of providers to the
extent that conduct is consistent with an approved tariff. However,
just as with other commodities, the evolution of successful markets in
formerly regulated commodities, such as electric power, depends on
the articulation of clear rules governing contracts, trading, and the
regulation of market manipulation.
In the cost-of-service environment that dominated during the
twentieth century, manipulation of the filed tariff shield by regulated
firms posed little harm to the extent that regulation of the firm's costs
was the norm and regulators actively used the rate-making process to
protect consumers from injury. In the current environment, where
competitive markets have displaced traditional rate regulation,
invocation of a filed tariff shield poses a more serious risk of harm.
The doctrine would be relatively harmless if regulators, in approving
and monitoring tariffs, were willing and able to monitor breach of
contract, fraud and other torts, and antitrust misconduct. In several
ways, however, the willingness and ability of federal regulators to
monitor and sanction such conduct is seriously limited. Since federal
regulators do not have plenary authority, by filing overbroad tariffs

141. Cf. id. (arguing that, under the filed tariff doctrine, all prices changes are required to
be filed with FERC).
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regulated firms may be able to escape scrutiny altogether in their
control of essential facilities, such as electric transmission.
For
example, FERC does not regulate retail transmission sales (e.g., how a
utility allocates the costs of transmission to its retail customers), but a
firm may still seek FERC's acquiescence in its retail cost allocation,
thus inviting a court to apply the filed tariff shield to conduct related
to retail pricing. 142
Even assuming that an agency has jurisdiction over the tariff
terms, in initially approving tariffs regulators are not likely to have an
opportunity to fully assess every potential violation of the public
interest. As was the case with FERC's Order No. 888, federal
regulators may approve tariffs with only a perfunctory review of their
1 43
terms and conditions, rubberstamping standard tariffs en masse.
Further, once a violation of a tariffs terms is alleged, if a complaint is
filed, an agency has a broad degree of discretion-more so than
courts-in deciding whether to investigate and prosecute alleged
violations; this discretion may be influenced by under-funded
enforcement budgets and competing priorities.
Many alleged
violations will simply never be investigated, pursued, or heard.
Finally, absent specific grants of authority, agencies such as
FERC and the FCC, unlike the now-defunct ICC (whose powers were
at issue in Keogh), do not have significant powers to assess and
enforce penalties against wrongdoers. 44 In a deregulated market,
enforceable remedies for misconduct are important to deter fraud and
other types of strategic market manipulation. However, the agencies
implementing deregulatory policies themselves frequently lack the
authority to pursue or impose such remedies. For example, FERC's
remedial powers are limited to refund authority and nationwide
license revocation. 145 In its initial report on potential manipulation of
electric and natural gas prices in the West, focused on misconduct
associated with California's deregulation conduct, FERC's staff
recommended refunds. In addition, FERC's staff noted the possibility
of FERC's imposition of penalties through tariff monitoring and

142. Retail pricing issues are regularly implicated in wholesale tariff filings. See, e.g., Fed.
Power Comm. v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (holding that FERC's consideration of
wholesale rates may include the relationship between wholesale and retail rates, but stopping
short of requiring FERC to consider retail rates).
143. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part II.B.2.
145. See FERC, Initial Report on Company-Specific Separate Proceedings and Generic
Reevaluations; Published Natural Gas Price Data; and Enron Trading Strategies: Fact-Finding
Investigation of Potential Manipulation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices 3-6, (Aug. 2002),
available at http:/www.ferc.govllegal/staff-rep-elec.asp.
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suspension. 146 Companies such as Enron, alleged to have engaged in
strategic manipulation of California's market (which in Enron's case,
the Commission staff alleged, arose to the level of "deceit, including
the submission of false information"), 147 would thus be subject to
refunds and, possibly, the threat of losing the ability to participate in
48
deregulated markets.'
Yet neither of these powers is sufficient to deter misconduct in
deregulated markets. Refund authority is not adequate to deter
wrongdoing beyond normal breach of contract remedies, and even then
49
it merely approximates the deterrence of the restitution remedy.
Nationwide license revocation authority may be an overly blunt tool
for deterring wrongdoing. If federal regulators lack the authority to
impose penalties directly, they must rely on their permitting and
licensing powers, attempting to do indirectly what they are not
authorized to do directly. For instance, as FERC's staff noted in its
report, FERC does not have the authority to directly impose
penalties. 150 In addition, no agency can specify every market rule ex
ante. Agencies also frequently lack jurisdiction over every transaction
5
in an industry, as well as every actor participating in a market.' '
The jurisdictional gap is even more pronounced when agencies
have waived jurisdictional requirements, as FERC has done in order
to encourage the growth of competition. FERC's staff acknowledged
the significance of this problem when it recommended that "all
market-based rate tariffs include standard provisions so that the
Commission can go beyond simply refunding profits and impose
penalties on violators."' 52 Clearly, FERC had not anticipated the
market abuses that evolved when it initially approved market-based
146. See id.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Id. at 3-5.
149. A restitution remedy might deter misconduct adequately if courts were concerned with
inducing efficient behavior in plaintiffs, but the main deterrence concern in this context is the
defendant. See George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1233-39 (1994) (advocating a fault-based economic theory of contract damages in place of strict
liability principles in order to provide the correct incentives to contracting parties). Automatic
restitution would under-deter wrongdoing where the defendant's conduct is at issue. Choice of a
remedy is best evaluated under contract law or other legal principles that the filed tariff shield
completely forecloses.
150. "Staff is aware that Congress is considering expanding the Commission's currently very
limited civil penalty authority, and we strongly endorse expanded civil penalty authority that
applies to jurisdictional companies that violate the Commission's orders and regulations, as a
means to deter the types of conduct we have encountered in this investigation." FERC, supra
note 145, at 6.
151. FERC's jurisdiction, for example, is limited in such respects. FERC lacks jurisdiction
over retail sales and suppliers participating in only retail sales markets. See supra note 128.
152. FERC, supranote 145, at 6..
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tariffs. Its failure to do so left FERC with little remedy against
wrongdoers. Even if FERC did have a remedy that it could legally
exercise under its licensing powers, to the extent it is procedurally
more difficult to revoke an existing license than to regulate its terms
and conditions without revocation, due process restrictions make it
more difficult to take away a license than to impose a penalty. To the
extent that grounds for revocation can be established, the remedy is
draconian: nationwide in scope (thus excessively harsh in its
consequence), harmful to consumers to the extent it over-deters, and
costly for regulators. Conditioning license approval at the front end
may prove simpler, but once licensed it is difficult to impose new
conditions on some, but not others, without facing protracted legal
challenges.
Indeed, to the extent that an agency, such as FERC, does not
even assert jurisdiction over deregulated market actors in compliance
with filed rates, the agency may lack any remedies at all for abuses of
deregulated power markets. It is not surprising that California
Governor Gray Davis (himself facing an election year run-off when
FERC's report was issued) issued a stinging criticism of FERC's
report, calling it "whitewash, pure and simple." 15 3 Governor Davis
chastised FERC because it "hasn't sanctioned anybody, it hasn't
issued any refunds to us, it's done nothing to stop the manipulation
15 4
which everyone agrees occurred here in California."
When agency oversight possesses such negative characteristics,
whether due to limited jurisdiction or inadequate resources, judicial
enforcement of remedies has much to offer. In many instances, courts
will have distinct comparative institutional advantages over agencies
in defining standards and deterring violations of market norms.
Courts, unlike most regulatory agencies, are not constrained by
Congress' delegation of authority as expressed in enabling or more
specific statutes. Moreover, the judicial forum offers complex cases
many benefits that the agency forum routinely lacks: broader
discovery, since courts can seek discovery in the context of litigation
absent express delegations from Congress; wider remedial authority,
since courts can draw on their injunctive and equitable powers as well
as common law and statutory grounds for damages; and greater
political independence, since courts are not beholden to the executive
branch or Congress.

153. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Energy Pricing Suspicious, Report Says, N,Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2002, at C1, 2002 WL 25401596.
154. Id.
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Common law and antitrust remedies are not perfect at
effectuating deterrence, but absent a clear indication that regulation
is intended to preempt or supersede them, these remedies play a
central role in deterrence regimes for competitive service markets.
Put simply, to the extent that common law or antitrust remedies are
sought against service providers, absent a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, courts are an essential enforcement vehicle for consumer
155
protection norms, particularly in the context of deregulation.
Unless Congress expands the powers of federal agencies to directly
enforce penalties against wrongdoers in deregulated markets, the filed
tariff shield will invite even further strategic abuse of the regulatory
process and thwart effective deterrence of market wrongdoing. More
radical deregulation than either Congress or agencies envision will
result.
IV. MISPLACED FORTIFICATION OF THE SHIELD

As a matter of economic theory, the introduction of competition
to infrastructure utility industries could be expected to tarnish the
armor of the filed rate shield, perhaps even leading courts to abandon
it. Ironically though, as markets have developed in formerly regulated
industries, courts have increasingly turned the filed tariff doctrine
into a mandate for regulators, flatly contradicting the agency
deference rationales behind the doctrine. Further, when courts have
applied the doctrine in the battles surrounding electric power
deregulation they have done so in ways that are demonstrably
overbroad and potentially harmful to consumers and competition.
Effectively, a doctrine that once lent flexibility to regulators is now
binding for both regulators and courts, providing little hope for the
enforcement of market norms where a regulated firm has submitted
tariffs to regulators. To the extent the shield once might have allowed
flexibility, depending on the policy choice of regulators, today the
doctrine has become more like a fortress-expansive and rigid in scope
and structure.

155. While deregulation may make the problem more salient, the enforcement gap arguably
existed under cost-of-service regulation as well. See G.E. Hale & Rosemary Hale, Competition or
Control Vi Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 46, 58-59
(1962) (arguing for broad antitrust exemption for regulated industries, but also urging an
exception "when the regulatory burden is so great that effective control cannot be achieved.").
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A. Fortification
It is odd enough that in its short history the filed rate doctrine
has become a shield for regulated utilities against consumer protection
litigation, much to the chagrin of the initial intended beneficiaries of
the doctrine.
Even more curious is that the doctrine, once
institutionally justified as a type of deference to agency regulators,
has been co-opted by the judiciary to preclude regulators from
exercising their discretion to repudiate the shield.
At first blush, the agency deference rationale for filed tariff
shield 156 nicely converges with the modern Chevron approach to
judicial review of agencies. 157 Chevron set forth a test that has become
the predominant paradigm for judicial review of agency
interpretations of statutes. 158 The Chevron test distills the judicial
review task into two distinct steps. At step one, a court inquires into
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." 159 If Congress has-and has done so clearly-the court "must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 160 If,
on the other hand, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific question at issue, a court is to move on to Chevron's step
two. Here, the court defers to the agency, giving the agency's
interpretations "controlling weight, unless they are arbitrary,
1 61
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
By leaving all tariff matters entirely within the realm of the
agency's regulatory choices, rather than in the courts, the filed tariff
shield converges with the approach of step two of the Chevron
framework. It also seems consistent with Chevron's goals. 162 In

156. See supra Part II.B.2.
157. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
158. Chevron remains good law in most cases involving formal adjudication and notice and
comment rulemaking, but a recent lines of cases has limited the scope of Chevron deference. See,
e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-31 (2001) (refusing Chevron deference to an
informal adjudication, but leaving the doctrine's future applicability to evaluation of a series of
ad hoc factors); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (refusing to apply
Chevron to a Department of Labor opinion letter). Nevertheless, the basic principle that an
agency's interpretation is entitled to great weight is well established, even for proceedings that
lie beyond Chevron's doctrinal pale. For further discussion of Chevron deference, see Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Jim Rossi, Respecting
Deference: ConceptualizingSkidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1105 (2001).
159. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
160. Id. at 843.
161. Id. at 844.
162. For the argument that relying on agencies to resolve regulatory disputes is a salutary
and intentional development linked to Chevron, see Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
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Chevron, Justice Stevens defended deference for reasons of agency
expertise and political accountability. 16 3
Commentators have
continued to embrace these goals, understanding Chevron as a
doctrine that legitimates reasoned decision making by administrative
agencies. 164 The filed tariff doctrine, understood in this context, also
respects the sphere of agency discretion to make regulatory and policy
choices, thus protecting both agency expertise and political
165
accountability.
However, recent case law applying the filed tariff doctrine casts
doubt on the doctrine's compatibility with Chevron deference. Rather
than deferring to agency decisions regarding the impact of filed tariffs,
recent decisions treat the filed tariff doctrine as a Chevron step one
issue. 166 This approach has transformed the filed tariff doctrine into
what Professor William Eskridge refers to as a "statutory precedent,"
167
which courts believe only Congress has the authority to change.
Courts have even more firmly cast the filed tariff doctrine as a
Chevron step one issue as agencies have moved away from traditional
cost-of-service filing requirements in their initial efforts at
deregulation. As a result, the filed tariff doctrine has been elevated to
a principle of statutory precedent, leaving courts and agencies little
option but to treat tariff-related matters as jurisdiction defining for
courts.
As discussed above, deregulation of utility industries has led
many agencies to experiment with detariffing, in which the agency
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1715-17
(2001).
163. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
164. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevr:.i and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990)
(explaining that Chevron is justified by the agency's superior political accountability); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: EmphasizingReasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96-97 (1994) (arguing that agencies are
institutionally superior to courts in their capacity for making politically accountable decisions).
165. Also like Chevron, the filed tariff doctrine promotes uniformity. See Peter L. Strauss,
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources
for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1113-14 (1987) (recognizing that
adjudication by specialist, national agencies rather than the geographically organized courts
promotes centralized national determinations of legal and policy questions).
166. See, e.g., AT&T v. Central Office Co., 524 U.S."214 (1998); MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218
(1994).
167. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 136263 (1988). As Professor Eskridge argues, if courts adopted an "evolutive" approach to statutory
interpretation, allowing them to overrule interpretations at Chevron's step one, courts would be
far less wed to the filed tariff doctrine. See id. at 1377-78. For example, Professor Eskridge
argues that under the evolutive approach, the Supreme Court would, in reviewing Judge
Friendly's Square D opinion, have overruled Keogh. See id. at 1415-21. For discussion of Square
D, see infra Part II.B.2.
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itself no longer even processes tariffs, or with market-based or open
access tariffs, which are designed to enhance industry-wide
competition. Federal agencies have almost completely moved away
from the traditional cost-of-service tariff, in which regulators
determine firm-specific rates. 168 This movement contrasts sharply
with the cost-based approach to tariffing, in which utility rates and
tariffs were approved in an ad hoc fashion based on an individual
utility's circumstances. Since the 1980s, the electric power industry
has undergone a remarkable, if controversial, transformation, but the
trucking and telecommunications industries have also undergone
transformations in the direction of developing competitive markets in
formerly regulated services, leading regulators to expressly repudiate
16 9
the filed tariff doctrine.
Where regulators have attempted to repudiate the filed tariff
doctrine, however, courts stand firmly by the doctrine, rather than
deferring to the regulator. Recognizing changes to the motor carrier
industry, the ICC was the first agency to attempt to repudiate the
filed tariff doctrine, 170 only to have its decision reversed by the
1 71
Supreme Court in Maislan.
In 1986, the ICC determined that,
given the need for flexibility from the harshness of the filed rate
doctrine, it would allow carriers and shippers to negotiate rates. The
agency reasoned that "the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
which significantly deregulated the motor carrier industry, justified
the change in policy, for the new competitive atmosphere made strict
application" of the filed tariff doctrine "unnecessary to deter
discrimination."'1 72 In invoking the filed tariff shield to allow a
bankruptcy trustee's claim against a shipper to recover the difference
between a filed rate and a lower negotiated rate (a classic
"undercharge" claim), the Supreme Court rejected the ICC's policy as
inconsistent with the ICA, precluding the ICC from releasing a
shipper from liability for undercharges. 73 The Court observed that

168. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3; Richard Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A
Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155 (2001).
169. See infra notes 170-189 and accompanying text.
170. See Michael A. Rouse, A Re-Evaluation of the "FiledRate" Doctrine in Light of Revised
Regulatory Policy and Carriers' Practices: INF, Ltd. v. Spectro Alloys Corp., 23 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 669, 678 (1990) (endorsing Eighth Circuit opinions upholding the ICC's 1986 policy to
repudiate the filed tariff doctrine).
171. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 119 (1990).
172. Id. at 121 (observing that "the ICC concluded that changes in the motor carrier industry
'clearly warrant a tempering of the former harsh rule of adhering to the tariff rate in virtually all
cases"' (quoting Nat'l Indus. Transp. League, Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated
Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I.C.C.2d 99, 106 (1986))).
173. See id. at 131.
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the filed rate doctrine has long governed the legal relationships
between shippers and carriers and is essential to preventing price
discrimination. 1 74 Given the plain meaning of the statute's prohibition
of price discrimination, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in
Maislin, reasoned that it must "read the statute to create strict filed
rate requirements and to forbid equitable defenses to collection of the
filed tariff."'175 Deviation from this statutory requirement could only
be made by Congress, the Court noted:
Congress has not diverged from this interpretation and we decline to revisit it ourselves.
Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination
interpretation of the
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later
76
statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning.1

Following the Supreme Court's rejection of the ICC's repudiation of
the filed tariff doctrine, Congress addressed the issue in the
Negotiated Rates Act of 1993, which overturned Maislan's
invalidation of the ICC's negotiated rates policy.177
Maislan is significant for its approach to applying the filed rate
doctrine in the context of the ICA. The majority did not invoke the
filed rate doctrine as a type of deference to regulators, precluding
courts from exercising jurisdiction because in the agency's judgment
judicial remedies were unnecessary. Instead, the majority reasoned
that Congress, by adopting the ICA and its prohibition on price
discrimination, had precluded the courts from exercising jurisdiction
over other common law and statutory claims. 178
In his Maislin
dissent, Justice Stevens, who had previously endorsed some criticisms
of the filed tariff doctrine, 179 noted that a "recurring theme" in the
cases that developed the filed tariff doctrine "is that the Commission,
rather than the courts, should have primary responsibility for

174. Id. at 126.
175. Id. at 127.

176. Id. at 131 (citation omitted).
177. Negotiated Rates Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-180, 107 Stat. 2044. For a discussion of
the potential liability that shippers and carriers face without the filed rate doctrine, see William
W. Pugh, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Shipper Liability Absent the Filed Rate Doctrine, 58
TRANSP. PRAC. J. 309, 321-28 (1991) (advising against the reversal of Maislin by Congress, since
shippers will be subject to greater civil and criminal penalties, including penalties for violation of
the antitrust laws and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act).
178. See Maislin, 497 U.S. at 130-32. The case, in other words, is a classic Chevron step-one
application of what the majority deems clear and unambiguous statutory language, precluding
agencies and courts from making a contrary interpretation. One author characterizes Maislin as
the first case in a trilogy of Supreme Court cases using judicial precedent to preclude agency
deference. See Paul A. Dame, Note, Stare Decisis, Chevron and Skidmore: Do Administrative
Agencies Have the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 405, 420-21 (2002).

179. See Square D. Co., 476 U.S. at 423-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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administration of the statute."18 0 To this extent, Maislin illustrates
the potential for a full Lochner-ization of the filed rate doctrine-a
principle the majority, and Justice Scalia's concurrence, allows in
order to protect tariff expectations of regulated firms not only vis-i-vis
courts and state regulators, but also vis-A-vis federal agencies, which
face the risk of judicial rejection if they attempt to repudiate the filed
18 1
rate doctrine.
Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court has
steadfastly
required
adherence
to
filed
rates
in
the
telecommunications context, even when the FCC itself had decided to
repudiate the doctrine. Initially, in American Broadcasting Cos. v.
FCC, the Second Circuit held that the FCC's failure to reject a tariff
filing was unreviewable by the court when third parties sought to
challenge the tariff under the FCA. 8 2 Later, the FCC itself attempted
to detariff in order to allow customers to enter into enforceable
contracts that would not be superseded by the tariff filing. In MCI v.
AT&T, the United States Supreme Court, aided by use of a dictionary,
relied on Congress' clear and unambiguous language to invalidate an
FCC detariffing policy, which prohibited nondominant carriers from
filing tariffs.18 3 AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. similarly
barred federal courts from hearing state law contract and tort claims
that conflicted with filed tariffs approved by the FCC, even where the

180. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 146 n.12. Justice Stevens argues that a reasonable agency
interpretation is subject to judicial deference. Id. at 151-52 (noting majority's failure to heed
Chevron deference). Justice Stevens noted that the most notable exception to this agency
deference theme in the ratemaking context is TIM.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959),
a 5-4 decision prohibiting district courts from staying collection proceedings pending agency
review of the filed rate. Id. at 147 n.12. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371
U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962), greatly limited TIM.E., Inc. and Congress later repudiated it. Id.; see also
Interstate Commerce Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 89-170, §§ 6-7, 79 Stat. 648, 651-52 (1965)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3), 11706(c)(2) (1982)).
181. See Maislin, 497 U.S. at 136 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Whatever else may qualify as an
unreasonable practice, under no sensible construction of that term could it consist of failing to do
what the statute explicitly prohibits doing-viz., charging or receiving a rate different from the
rate specified in a tariff."). Hence, Justice Scalia believes the Court is required to apply the clear
and unambiguous statutory language under Chevron step one analysis, rather than afford a
reasonable agency interpretation deference under step two, as would Justice Stevens. Id. A
defense of Maislin is provided in Howard R. Rubin, Reiter v. Cooper and UnreasonableRates:
Are Reports of the Filed Rate Doctrine's Death Greatly Exaggerated?, 42 DUKE L.J. 905, 940-42
(1993) (proposing doctrinal coexistence of the filed rate doctrine and an unreasonable rates
defense).
182. ABC v. FCC, 662 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1981).
183. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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tariffs did not cover the services that were the subject of the judicial
18 4
dispute.
With little help from the courts, federal telecommunications
regulators subsequently repudiated the filed tariff doctrine-at least
insofar as it had a preemptive effect on state law claims. In its
Communications
the
Federal
order,
detariffing
mandatory
Commission required long distance carriers to withdraw their paper
tariffs on file, and replace them by posting "rates, terms, and
condition[s]" on each carrier web site or at some other central
location.18 5 By January 2001, carriers were no longer allowed to rely
on the published tariff.1 8 6 Effectively, this opens up each carrier's
relationship with customers to the scrutiny of state authorities,
including contract and other consumer protection laws.18 7 Carriers are
also subject to direct scrutiny of federal antitrust law, since allegedly
anticompetitive conduct would no longer qualify for regulated industry
Both MCI and AT&T
immunity from antitrust enforcement.1 8 8
required the FCC to adhere to the filed tariff doctrine to common
carriers under Section 203 of the FCA. However, in the context of
interchange carriers which do not exercise market power, the FCC has
successfully implemented detariffing, largely due to Congress.
Congress' intent to enhance competition in telephony in the 1996
Telecommunications Act, which the FCC claims does not contain an
express filing requirement, provides sufficient statutory basis to bring
the issue into the realm of agency policy making, providing the FCC
the authority that the Maislin majority determined that the ICC
lacked.189

184. 524 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1998). Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in AT&T,
echoing the majority opinions in Maislin and MCI. See id. at 216. Justice Stevens dissented from
all three opinions. See id. at 231; MCI, 512 U.S. at 538; Maislin, 497 U.S. at 138.
185. See Helein et al., supra note 137, at 282-83.
186. Id.

187. See id. at 289-95 (noting that the filed tariff doctrine had a principal effect of overriding
certain consumer protection laws).
188. Under the emerging Goldwasser doctrine, portions of the filed tariff doctrine may
survive as antitrust claims that overlap with alleged violations of the Telecommunications Act of
1996. See Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000); infra note 249.
189. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorizes the FCC to forbear from applying
Section 203 tariffing requirements if it concludes that: (1) enforcement of the tariffing
requirement is not necessary to ensure that carrier rates remain just and reasonable; (2)
enforcement is not necessary for consumer protection; and (3) eliminating the tariffing
requirement serves the public interest. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, § 401, 110 Stat. 56, 128 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000)). See generally Scott M.
Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications Market: The
Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM.

L.J. 367 (1997).
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Against the backdrop of these recent cases, it is clear that
courts today do not see the filed tariff doctrine as a matter of agency
choice. It also is not considered a matter of judicial choice. Courts
today consider themselves bound by previous cases which interpret
the clear and unambiguous choices of Congress in regulatory statutes
to require filed tariffs and preclude judicial enforcement of antitrust
and common law claims. This has invited courts to conflate the
distinction between the filed tariff doctrine, the applicability of which
should depend on firm-specific agency regulatory choices, and implied
antitrust immunity, which is not firm-specific and applies where
applications of the antitrust laws present a plain repugnancy to a
congressionally sanctioned regulatory program. 190
To be sure, such fortification of the filed tariff shield enhances
the relative institutional authority of agencies vis-A-vis courts in
considering tariff-related matters. If, however, the agency lacks
statutory authority or resources to fully implement and enforce a
regulatory model, the expertise and accountability values promoted by
Chevron could be thwarted, rather than enhanced, by courts
mandating the acceptance of tariffs and refusing to exercise
jurisdiction in enforcement cases against firms. This is particularly
problematic to the extent that the filed rate doctrine is a firm-specific
defense, making the institutional forum dependent on private, as
opposed to public, decisions about enforcement.
B. Weathering New Battles
With electric power deregulation, not only regulators have
refused to relax the filed tariff shield. Courts have also vigorously
embraced the filed tariff doctrine, primarily to keep state law
consumer claims from proceeding in federal courts. As these cases
exemplify, the filed tariff doctrine has evolved far beyond its consumer
protection origins, and continues to allow regulated firms to benefit
from the federal tariffs, even in instances where federal regulators
lack the ability to deter fraud or remedy harm to consumers.
The filed tariff doctrine has become central to the jurisdictional
battles surrounding electric power deregulation, particularly in the
state of California. Cases arising from these battles illustrate how,
within the judiciary, the doctrine retains its vigor even in a
deregulatory environment. Further, they illustrate how courts often
overreach in applying the doctrine, effectively invoking a shield
against any serious protections for consumers in the context of
190. See supra note 5.
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deregulated markets.
Courts are consistently sweeping in their
invocation of the doctrine, in ways that infer preemption from trivial
regulatory actions or strained, tenuous connections between federal
regulation and the potential result of allowing the claim to go forward
in court.
Even before the California deregulation crisis, the filed tariff
shield was invoked to bar antitrust claims in the context of wholesale
power deregulation. For example, the City of Norwood, Massachusetts
brought a price squeeze claim against New England Power Company,
alleging, among other claims, that the defendant offered Norwood
affiliates preferential treatment as customers over Norwood.' 91 The
claim was based on the combined effect of two tariffs--one, imposing a
contract termination charge on Norwood; the other, a wholesale
standard offer rate that was extended to Norwood affiliates but not to
municipalities such as Norwood. 192 FERC had approved these terms
as "just and reasonable" as a part of New England Power Company's
1 93
restructuring plan, which included approval of market-based tariffs.
Since both tariffs were on file with FERC, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invoked the filed rate doctrine as
a complete bar to the price squeeze claim. The court observed that
"[h]ere, any meaningful relief as to the price squeeze would require
the alteration of tariffs-and not merely tariffs subject to regulation

but tariffs actually scrutinized repeatedly by FERC

....

."194

Because

"the rationale for the filed rate doctrine is to protect the exclusive
authority of the agency to accept or challenge such tariffs,"' 95 in the
view of the First Circuit, "this is not a case that calls out for revisiting
the filed rate doctrine or for strenuous efforts to carve out
exceptions .... "196
In fact, the First Circuit explicitly refused to revisit the
doctrine in light of the emerging deregulated wholesale market for
electric power, stating:
Of course, if New England Power's rates were truly left to the market, with no filing
requirement or FERC supervision at all, the filed rate doctrine would by its terms no
longer operate. But unlike some other regulatory agencies, FERC is still responsible for
ensuring "just and reasonable" rates and, to that end, wholesale power rates continue to
be filed and subject to agency review. 197

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 418 (1st Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 420 (emphasis in original).
Id. (citing Ark.-La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1981)).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
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The First Circuit's reluctance to abandon the doctrine has echoed
throughout the federal judiciary, as courts have increasingly been
requested to intervene in disputes surrounding deregulation in the
United States. Federal courts continue to vigorously endorse the filed
tariff shield, keeping competitor and consumer claims almost
completely out of the hands of both state regulators and federal courts.
For example, in Duke Energy Trading and Manufacturing,
L.L.C. v. Davis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applied the filed tariff doctrine to imply federal preemption of
the California Governor's effort to protect consumers against strategic
manipulation of its power market. In response to California's electric
power deregulation crisis, in January 2001, California Governor Davis
declared a state of emergency after concluding that 'the imminent
threat of widespread and prolonged disruption of electrical power...
constitutes a condition of extreme peril to the safety of persons and
property within the state."' 198 Following this declaration, the state
obtained a temporary restraining order against the California Power
Exchange (CalPX), which managed a market for block forward
contracts to deliver electricity through the end of 2001, including
contracts between Duke Energy, a wholesale supplier, and utilities,
such as Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas & Electric
Company.199 Later, it was alleged that Duke Energy and other
suppliers and marketers, such as Enron, were strategically
manipulating the market to reap massive profits. 200 As the state's
restraining order expired, Governor Davis, acting pursuant to the
California Emergency Services Act, issued two executive orders that
purported to "commandeer" block forward contracts "'to be held
subject to the control and coordination of the State of California.' 20 1
Duke Energy filed a suit seeking injunctive relief against
Governor Davis and alleging that his commandeering orders were
preempted by federal law. 20 2 Since the case was for injunctive relief,
not monetary damages, it is not at all clear how the filed tariff
doctrine would have served to protect customers against unjust
198. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001).
199. Id.
200. See FERC, FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACTFINDING INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS PRICES

(Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-rep-elec.asp. In August 2003, however,
FERC's staff cleared Duke Energy of any wrongdoing in manipulating the market. See FERC,
STAFF'S INITIAL REPORT ON PHYSICAL WITHHOLDING BY GENERATORS SELLING INTO THE
CALIFORNIA MARKET AND NOTIFICATION TO COMPANIES (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.

ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wem/2003/WithholdingReport8-1-03.pdf.
201. Duke Energy, 267 F.3d at 1047.
202. Id.
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discrimination. Nevertheless, after deciding that the case should not
be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, 203 the Ninth Circuit
panel applied the filed rate doctrine, which led the court to an
inference of preemption. In the court's view, "'interstate power rates
filed with FERC ... must be given binding effect"' by state regulators,
even when regulating in areas subject to state jurisdiction. 20 4 Thus,
the court stated with a sweeping confidence, "FERC-approved rates
preempt conflicting regulations adopted by the States." 20 5
While the case contains broad claims about how a filed rate
creates an inference of federal preemption of California Governor
Davis' commandeering order, the analysis in the opinion is wanting.
The Ninth Circuit observed that, "[b]y preventing CalPX from
liquidating the IOUs' block forward positions to cover their defaults in
the CalPX markets, Governor Davis's commandeering orders
effectively rewrote the terms of the CTS rate schedule [approved by
FERC], depriving wholesale suppliers such as Duke of their
bargained-for collateral and default mitigation rights." 20 6 Since FERC
had previously refused to allow CalPX to amend its tariff to lower the
short-term credit ratings of market participants, and since the effect
of Governor Davis' commandeering order was to deprive wholesale
suppliers of this financial protection, the court concluded that the
Governor's actions conflicted with federal law. The court, however,
20 7
provided little analysis to support this conclusion.
In another case related to California's deregulation crisis,
municipal utilities in the state seeking an expansion of transmission
capacity sued several regional utilities, including Bonneville Power
Administration, a federal agency, seeking monetary damages for
breach of contract, tort, conversion, trespass, nuisance, and, in one
instance, fraud. 20 8 The basic claim was that the regional utilities had
203. Normally, a suit against a state is subject to sovereign immunity, but under Ex parte
Young a suit challenging the legality under federal law of a state official's action enforcing state
law is not a suit against the state. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). In Idaho v. Coeur dAlene Tribe,
the United States Supreme Court recently limited Ex parte Young suits where "special
sovereignty interests" are implicated, such as the state's regulatory authority over submerged
lands within its geographic territory. 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997). The Ninth Circuit held that the
Duke Energy's suit (requesting an injunction against a specific decision) did not implicate these
"special sovereignty interests," since it did not permanently deprive California's Governor of his
emergency powers, and thus did not invoke the exception to Ex parte Young recognized in Couer
d'Alene. See Duke Energy, 267 F.3d at 1052-55.
204. Id. at 1056 (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962, 966
(1986)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1056-57.
207. Id. at 1058.
208. Transmission Agency v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 295 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2002).
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run afoul of an agreement with the plaintiffs to jointly construct and
operate the interconnection of two large electricity inter-ties by
operating another inter-tie constructed and operated by the
defendants and approved by FERC. 20 9 Observing that FERC's
jurisdiction over wholesale transmission is exclusive, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs "cannot obtain state law money
damages allegedly resulting from the operation of an interstate
electricity inter-tie expressly approved by FERC, where the manner of
operation was necessarily contemplated at the time of approval." 210 In
a sweeping statement, characteristic of other courts invoking the
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit analogized, "allowing TANC to sue under
state law for damage allegedly caused to its transmission system by
an interconnected interstate system approved by FERC would be akin
to allowing an airline to sue under state law for economic damages
caused by another airline's FAA-approved flight plans." 211 The court
could not be saying that, by the very fact of federal approval of a flight
plan, airlines are somehow immune from all state law claims,
including negligence. Instead, what the court seems to be suggesting
is that federal approval of a flight plan supersedes any previous
private contractual agreement between airlines that conflict with the
plan. The court did not, however, explain why this result is required,
particularly since the effect of such a rule is to encourage regulated
firms to lobby regulators to indirectly invalidate contracts-a
particularly disturbing practice in a deregulatory environment. More
troubling, as in the Duke Energy case, the court failed to explain why
the tort, fraud and other property claims were preempted as a matter
of implied or conflict preemption jurisprudence. 2 12 Notwithstanding
its expansive invocation of the filed rate doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
did take the care to mention a recent United States Supreme Court
case which clarified the hypothetical reach of FERC's jurisdiction,
using the case to potentially narrow the application of the filed tariff
21 3
doctrine in future cases.
209. Id. at 922.
210. Id. at 928.
211. Id. at 929.
212. Noting that "the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue of whether a claim based
upon fraud before an agency can be preempted by the filed rate doctrine," the Ninth Circuit sided
with two other circuits which found filed rate preemption under such circumstances. Id. at 933;
see Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1992); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992).
213. As the court stated:
We have grounded our decision in the filed rate doctrine, despite the existence of
separate FERC authority over transmission capacity, because no court has yet
determined whether the rule against courts assuming hypothetical allocations of
transmission capacity would apply if the hypothetical allocations of transmission
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Consistent with the sweeping filed tariff doctrine embraced in
these Ninth Circuit cases, a federal district court in California
recently invoked the doctrine to bar state regulators from limiting a
utility's ability to recover the costs of power in the deregulated
wholesale market. 214 California electric utilities have consistently
claimed that the refusal of the California Public Utility Commission to
increase retail rates as wholesale prices for purchased power
skyrocketed during the state's deregulation crisis is illegal under the
filed tariff doctrine, since FERC had approved wholesale prices based
on deregulated market conditions. 215 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Lynch, a federal district court agreed, holding that the filed tariff
doctrine precludes the state of California from setting retail rates
below FERC-authorized wholesale rates and prohibiting the recovery
of losses, and setting for hearing issues of fact regarding PG&E's claim
for recovery. 216 Like the other Ninth Circuit cases applying the filed
tariff doctrine in the deregulatory environment, the court in Lynch
embraced a preemption analysis, rather than the analysis applied to
antitrust claims in Keogh. Also like the other Ninth Circuit cases, the
federal district court in Lynch made several broad-brush statements
regarding the scope of the filed tariff shield. For instance, the court
stated that "across all regulated industries to which it pertains, the
filed rate doctrine has been strictly and rigidly applied, without
concern for the equities of application." 2 17 Although the court in Lynch
was clear that it was applying the federal preemption strand of filed
tariff cases-rather than the deference strand that can be traced to
Keogh-it noted that arguments that "the introduction of competition
into a regulated industry brings into question the continuing
application of the filed rate doctrine" have been "uniformly rejected by
2 18
courts in the regulatory contexts in which they have been raised."

capacity did not affect FERC-controlled rates. We note, however, that as the Supreme
Court has recently explained, FERC's jurisdiction of electricity transmission, unlike
its jurisdiction over sales (i.e. rates) can reach intrastate transmissions. Hence, we
reserve for future resolution the question whether federal law preempts claims that
assume a hypothetical allocation of intrastate transmission capacity, notwithstanding
FERC's lack of authority over intrastate sales.
Sierra Pac., 295 F.3d at 931 n.9 (citing New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 25 (2002)).
214. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
215. In one context, the issue was settled (allowing the utility to recover $3.3 billion of its
$6.3 billion claimed loss), but the utility's argument, if successful, would have prevented the
state of California from limiting recovery in retail rates costs incurred in accordance with FERCapproved tariffs. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
216. See Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-40, 1049.
217. Id. at 1038.
218. Id. at 1039.
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The Duke Energy case ignores established limits on the
application of the filed tariff doctrine by applying it in a context
involving injunctions, not awards for money damages. 2 19 Beyond that
defect, the Ninth Circuit's decisions in these cases are otherwise
consistent with courts' invocations of the filed rate doctrine as a bar to
claims, even in the context of electric power deregulation. 220 Even
after California's deregulation crisis, which has challenged the
traditional jurisdictional battle lines in the electric power industry,
the shield remains steadfast, its armor untarnished. Where invoked,
courts have turned it into a fortress, beyond the power even of federal
regulators to abandon.
V. INVASION
Since the filed tariff doctrine's inception, federal courts have
evolved more sophisticated doctrines for assessing jurisdiction. Yet
courts continue to invoke the filed rate shield as a shorthand way of
bypassing these other doctrines, inviting federal courts to overreach in
refusing jurisdiction, often at the cost of protections for consumers and
competition. Modern federal preemption analysis or a careful
assessment of antitrust defenses and immunities provides a greater
opportunity to protect the public interest in robust enforcement of
market abuses, safeguarding against strategic uses of the regulatory
process to forum shop while also addressing the issue of dual
enforcement.
A. FederalPreemption Analysis
Federal preemption doctrine, if explicitly and carefully
analyzed in the context of the specific federal approval and monitoring
actions at issue, holds great promise to deter violations of market
norms, providing a safeguard for consumers and competition. In order
for a complete analysis of preemption to occur, however, courts should
avoid inferring preemption from the mere act of tariff acceptance, as
the filed tariff shield invites. Courts also should be careful in making
tenuous, sometimes hypothetical, connections between federal
219. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Campbell v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 2001 WL 1860381 (E.D. Wash. Sept.
19, 2001) (invoking the filed rate doctrine as a bar to breach of contract claims even where, due
to the timing of the plaintiffs complaint, FERC does not have statutory authority to allow a
refund); Indeck Me. Energy, L.L.C. v. ISO New Eng., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 675, 690-92 (D. Del.
2001) (allowing the filed tariff doctrine to bar a claim for breach of contract against an
Independent Service Operator, where the primary basis for the breach claim was a challenge to
the spot energy market as operated within the discretion of the ISO, endorsed by FERC).
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regulation and a potential state law claim that has deterrence
purposes.
Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution states
that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land. .. ." As a matter of black letter law, federal preemption
jurisprudence is well established. Of course, Congress can expressly
preempt state or local law by using explicit statutory language. Courts
may also infer preemption in one of two ways: first, where federal
regulation occupies the field, leaving no room for supplemental
regulations by the states; second, where state or local law poses an
actual conflict with federal law. 22 1 Although established as a matter of
black letter law, federal preemption analysis remains highly
controversial, often resulting in split judicial decisions. Perhaps not
surprisingly, despite the Supreme Court's general acknowledgement
of a "'presumption against the preemption of state police power
regulations,"' 222 most commentators characterize the case law as
223
exhibiting a strong bias in favor of finding federal preemption.
Nevertheless, federal preemption analysis provides a useful
framework for evaluating the implications of using the existence of a
filed rate as a shorthand for reaching a preemption conclusion. In
regulatory contexts such as telecommunications and electric power,
Congress has envisioned a dual regulatory structure that allows
federal and state regulation to coexist. Given this, rarely, if ever, will
a federally approved tariff so occupy the field as to allow no room for
state regulation. Thus, it is certainly not appropriate to treat tariff
cases as "occupation of the field" preemption cases. Instead, if
anything, tariff cases are best characterized as actual preemption

221. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). For criticism of the development of federal preemption jurisprudence,
see Stephen A. Garbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 809-10 (1994)
(arguing that the Supremacy Clause was intended to create only "conflict" preemption); Caleb
Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290-91 (2000) (urging that courts place focus on whether
federal law preempts state law, in a sense similar to how one statute might supersede another,
rather than on traditional "obstacle" preemption analysis).
222. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518, 523 (1992)).
223. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 967, 1015 (2002) ("The Court is skeptical of the benefit of common law actions as a proper
element of a regulatory regime and enamored by federal regulatory uniformity and the certainty
and predictability for those regulated that comes with it."); David B. Spence & Paula Murray,
The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Analysis: A QuantitativeAnalysis, 87
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1153 (1999) ("A great deal of scholarly criticism has been directed at the
courts' apparent strategy of reserving the balance of regulatory power for the national
government ....).
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cases, in which the general claim is that state regulation poses a
barrier to effective federal regulation of the same activity.
The conflict between federal tariffs and state contract, tort or
fraud claims, however, is frequently hypothetical, not actual. For
example, as discussed above, 224 the relationship between an award of
contract damages and an approved rate is contingent on the
disallowance of litigation awards by federal regulators. Regulators
retain the power to adjust rates, even retroactively, to allow firms to
recover prudently incurred costs. For courts to imply preemption in
such contexts invites a seriously overreaching preemption analysis.
For instance, as Justice Stevens observed in his dissent to the
Court's holding that the filed tariff doctrine barred state common law
claims against long distance carriers in AT&T, an assessment of the
connection between the allegedly illegal conduct and the relationship
governed by the tariff is central to a full assessment of the preemptive
effect of a tariff.225 Such an analysis must evaluate the extent to
which a regulatory structure is designed to allow specific conduct-in
the case of AT&T, allegations of slamming-and whether the tariff
approval and monitoring process conflicts with the potential remedies
provided under state law.
Applying a similar analysis, the rationales for the Ninth
Circuit's inference of preemption in Duke Energy are shaky, if not
completely wrong. In approving the California Power Exchange tariff,
FERC also approved the operation of the market subject to California
law. California still had specific responsibilities to protect retail
customers from abuses by suppliers, such as those who strategically
manipulated California's newly deregulated market, and these
responsibilities included the potential exercise of the Governor's
emergency order authority, as well as state contract and consumer
protection laws. In addition, the sole basis for the Ninth Circuit's
inference of preemption was that state regulation would cause an
effect-a hypothetical reduction in Duke Energy's credit ratingconflicting with a term of an approved tariff.226 However, the
relationship between the state regulation that was preempted by the
federal tariff (Governor Davis' commandeering), and the conduct
approved by the federal tariff (retention of Duke Energy's credit
rating), was tenuous, at best.

224. See supra Part II.B.2.
225. "[W]e have never before applied that harsh doctrine [the filed rate doctrine] to bar relief
for tortious conduct with so little connection to, or effect upon, the relationship governed by the
tariff." AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
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Sometimes the Supreme Court has found implied obstacle
preemption even in the absence of any federal regulation. Yet, when it
does so it has expressed a strong concern for uniformity in national
law or policy. 227 With competition in formerly regulated industries,
concerns with nondiscrimination in pricing are fading; therefore,
uniformity in pricing, terms, and conditions is not likely to be a useful
standard for evaluating the legality of state regulation. 228 To the
extent that uniformity remains important, as Judge Friendly
recognized in Square D, the opportunity for plaintiffs to join as a class
provides a sufficient safeguard for uniformity interests in rates and
229
tariff terms and conditions.
Assessment of the preemption issues reveals that courts often
invoke filed tariffs as giving rise to implied preemption without
careful analysis of the issue of dual regulatory enforcement in the
regulatory environment. 230 Many of the instances in which courts
historically inferred preemption based solely on the existence of a
firm-specific filed tariff simply would not survive the appropriate
preemption analysis, for which establishment of an actual obstacle to
state regulation is necessary. 23 1 When applying correct preemption
analysis, courts must focus on the extent to which the agency itself
considered the matter 232-an issue which the filed tariff doctrine
completely ignores.2 33 Federal preemption analysis, though, provides

227. See, e.g, San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959) (holding
that even in the absence of a finding that the NLRB's determination that bargaining-related
conduct was protected, state law affecting that conduct was prohibited). Expressing fear of nonuniformity, the Court states "[o]ur concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free
from state regulation if national policy is to be left [unchanged]." Id.
228. For a similar criticism of admiralty preemption, see Young, supra note 42, at 357
(arguing against automatic admiralty preemption and concluding that "federal maritime
interests should prevail only when they are somehow related to the 'special' nature of admiralty";
that is, federal interest should prevail only in those instances where uniformity is necessary to
comply with the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution).
229. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
230. Likewise, Robert Rabin criticizes invocation of a regulatory compliance defense in tort
cases as ignoring the issue of risk, given multiple enforcement levels. See Robert L. Rabin,
Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2082 (2000) ("[Sltructural flaws in the
system are best addressed directly, rather than through an overbroad regulatory compliance
defense that fails to encompass the range of circumstances giving rise to drug-related injuries.").
231. Where an agency has not evaluated conduct, a court should fail to find a preemptive
effect. See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 937-38 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing preemption
defense based on filed tariff and finding contract provisions substantively unconscionable and
void for public policy, in context of consumer class action).
232. See McGreal, supra note 41, at 874-75 (stressing the importance of agency deliberation
in finding regulatory preemption based on an obstacle analysis).
233. "It is the filing of the tariffs, and not any affirmative approval or scrutiny by the agency,
that triggers the filed rate doctrine." Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408,
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a more complete picture of the regulatory problem, and thus should be
used by courts in considering the appropriateness of judicial
enforcement against the backdrop of dual regulatory problems, such
as the claim by Southern California Edison that the state of California
cannot cap retail prices in its state retail deregulation scheme, given a
deregulated wholesale market. 23 4 Federal preemption analysis also
provides a more solid rationale for evaluating the rate structure in
Lynch, which invoked a sweepingly broad filed tariff argument to
invalidate application of the same retail price cap to Pacific Gas &
Electric.235
B. Antitrust Defenses and Immunities
Modern antitrust defenses and immunities provide courts an
opportunity to safeguard the public interest in deterrence-largely
ignored by the filed tariff shield-in the context of federal antitrust
litigation. To be sure, per se defenses provide an important set of
protections against judicial overreaching on the basis of antitrust law
However, allowing the filed tariff
into competitive markets. 23 6
doctrine to become an independent, firm-specific antitrust defense-as
courts have-is unnecessary and harmful, given other doctrines that
protect agency discretion and state jurisdiction while also providing
courts the flexibility to evaluate dual enforcement issues. Courts
should independently assess whether tariffs qualify for immunity from
antitrust enforcement, using traditional antitrust law doctrines,
rather than using filed tariffs as a shorthand way of bypassing the
antitrust laws. In contexts in which in the filed rate bar has been
raised, antitrust defenses arise in two distinct scenarios: 1)
horizontally, in instances where federal regulators, rather than
federal courts, might assert jurisdiction over allegedly anticompetitive
conduct; and 2) vertically, in instances where federal regulators
approve one tariff and state regulators approve another tariff, and
hence a jurisdictional conflict arises because the allegedly

419 (1st Cir. 2000); see supra Part III.B (discussing the enforcement gap and FERC's inability
and failure to evaluate the firm's conduct in approving structural tariffs).
234. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 216-218 and accompanying text.
236. See Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 403
(1986) (observing that antitrust law is complex and courts often look for simplifying doctrines,
such as metaphors, per se rules, or easy exits that assist more difficult factual and analytical
inquiries); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (1984)
(discussing the use of presumptions in antitrust law to screen out cases in which the loss to
consumers and the economy is likely outweighed by the costs of inquiry and the risks of deterring
"procompetitive" behaviors).
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anticompetitive conduct is arguably within the realm of state
regulators or falls into a jurisdictional gap.
In both scenarios,
antitrust law already provides ways to respect the agency regulatory
process, making the filed tariff doctrine redundant.
1. Horizontal Jurisdictional Conflicts: Regulatory Compliance and
Primary Jurisdiction
In the horizontal scenario, courts since Keogh have invoked the
filed tariff shield to bar most antitrust claims, but do recognize certain
exceptions. 237 Nearly twenty years ago, Judge Friendly called the
doctrine into question in this context. 238 Although in Square D the
Supreme Court refused Judge Friendly's invitation to overturn Keogh,
Justice Stevens and a majority of the Court were notably sympathetic
to his critique. 239 Given the more prevalent emergence of market
norms, Judge Friendly's critiques resound even more clearly today.
Although recent Ninth Circuit cases refuse to allow deregulation to
threaten the application of the filed tariff doctrine, these cases are
solidly preemption cases rather than cases applying the basic
principles of Keogh. 240 Federal courts have yet to fully assess Keogh's
fate against the backdrop of electric power and telecommunications
deregulation.
Where federal regulators have approved all tariffs related to
allegedly anticompetitive conduct, the continued rationale for allowing
the filed rate doctrine to bar antitrust liability is questionable. The
strongest rationale for invoking the filed rate doctrine in this context
is out of respect for the expertise of agency regulators, reflected in the
deference strand of the filed tariff doctrine. In Town of Norwood, the
First Circuit characterized the legal foundations of the filed rate
doctrine as "extremely creaky," 241 but when invoked as a bar to
antitrust enforcement, the filed rate doctrine is also incoherent. To
begin, as with state contract and tort law claims, if misconduct
requires modification of tariff terms, regulators could easily
accommodate this need in future rate cases. 242 But also, as the court

237. They recognize exceptions particularly in the contexts of price squeeze, requests for
injunctive relief, and suits by competitors seeking lost profits. See supra Part II.B.2.
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part IV.B.
241. Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 420 (1st Cir. 2000).
242. Cf. Andrew G. Humphrey, Antitrust Jurisdictionand Remedies in an Electric Utility
Price Squeeze, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1090, 1107 n.73 (1985) (asserting that the filed rate doctrine is
"inapplicable in the price-squeeze context" as it is not "an attempt to relitigate a rate-setting
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itself noted in Norwood, in the context of the tariff approval action,
FERC had waived requirements that filed rates or tariffs be
accompanied and justified by cost-of-service data. 243 Such data would
be necessary for the agency itself to evaluate the price squeeze claim.
Notwithstanding the fact that the agency lacked sufficient data
to evaluate a claim of price squeeze, the court in Norwood concluded
that "[i]t is the filing of the tariffs, and not any affirmative approval or
scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the filed rate doctrine. '244 This is
dangerously broad language. By focusing on the filing of tariffs by
regulated firms, the court privileges private behavior rather than the
actual or anticipated actions by regulators that traditional deference
concepts evaluate. It is difficult to reconcile invocation of the filed rate
doctrine in the context of price squeeze claims-as the court struggled
with in Norwood-with other antitrust claims, in which the filed rate
doctrine has not been successfully invoked as a bar to litigation. For
example, mergers and sales of assets by utilities have been subject to
antitrust challenge even though the resulting rates were subject to
federal regulation and the merger or sale had been approved by
regulators. 245 Since Otter Tail, which allowed antitrust claims when
an agency had some jurisdiction, the simple filing of tariffs has not
precluded antitrust claims, even where regulators have partial
jurisdiction over conduct. 246 In a deregulated market, courts have a
particular responsibility to carefully assess tariffs in order to help
ensure that anticompetitive and otherwise illegal private conduct does
not "escape scrutiny" of applicable legal standards. 247 Otherwise, as
Judge Boudin (who penned Town of Norwood) warned in an earlierpublished article, through the repeated use of the filed tariff doctrine
the "metaphor is likely to exhaust itself,"248 undermining the very
competitive process it is designed to protect.
It is questionable whether the filed tariff doctrine adds to the
less intrusive tools available to courts in the horizontal context as
grounds for declining to consider a case. In the context of cases such
as Norwood-in which all of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is
subject to federal regulation-two extant legal doctrines apart from

which is subject to agency discretion." (citing City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173,
1179 (8th Cir. 1982))).
243. Norwood, 202 F.3d at 419.
244. Id.

245. Id. at 422 (citing Northeast Util. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 947 (1st Cir. 1993)
and California v. Fed. Power Comm., 369 U.S. 482 (1962)).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
247. Colum. Steel Casing Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1446 (9th Cir. 1997).
248. See Boudin, supra note 236, at 404.
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the filed tariff assess the appropriateness of judicial intervention: 1) a
doctrine of regulatory compliance, which has emerged in recent years
as a type of antitrust defense; and 2) the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, a general doctrine used by courts to refuse jurisdiction
over agency claims. Although these are not antitrust immunities, in
the sense of functioning as airtight and absolute defenses, they
provide adequate safeguards for preserving agency discretion to
evaluate claims of anticompetitive conduct (as the deference strand of
the filed tariff doctrine also purports to safeguard), making the filed
249
tariff shield in such circumstances completely unnecessary.
Even if conduct is not expressly immune from the antitrust
laws, good faith regulatory compliance can form a defense to a jury.
When a defendant is attempting to comply with regulatory policy,
"'something more than general intent should be required to establish a
Sherman Act violation.' 250
In addressing AT&T's rules for
interconnecting other long distance carriers with its local service
network, the Seventh Circuit stated, "[i]n the particular context of an
industry subject to extensive and rapidly changing regulatory
demands, we believe that an antitrust defendant is entitled both to
raise and to have a jury consider its good faith adherence to regulatory
obligations .. "."251

249. Where a plaintiff alleges violation of statutory provisions enforced by a federal agency,
an emerging doctrine of telecommunications law would seem to preclude a federal court from
considering the antitrust claim. See Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000)
(refusing antitrust jurisdiction where the FCC has enforcement authority under the 1996
Telecommunications Act). However, where a plaintiff has adequately pled an independent
antitrust claim, the Supreme Court has held that the 1996 Telecommunications Act's antitrust
savings clause preserves the claim, notwithstanding separate FCC interconnection regulation.
See Verizon v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004) (exercising
jurisdiction over essential facilities claim but rejecting the claim on its merits). For discussion of
this emerging doctrine for refusing antitrust enforcement, see Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The
Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing
Goldwasser but arguing against a categorical rule that would favor dismissal of all cases and
urging analysis of overlap between regulatory agency remedies and remedies available under
antitrust laws); RANDAL C. PICKER, UNDERSTANDING STATUTORY BUNDLES: DOES THE SHERMAN

ACT COME WITH THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT? (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Program in
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 177, Dec. 2002), (suggesting that increased standing eligibility
for breach of access violations under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 makes analytical sense,
but noting that limiting standing eligibility might be justified due to increased administrative
and error costs that could arise as a result), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/Papers/
Manhattan200.pdf.
250. City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting
City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Co., 616 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1980), and arguing that since
overall effect of utility's rates and practices suggested good faith behavior, utility was not acting
unlawfully).
251. MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 1983).
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The Seventh Circuit concurred with this general standard for
evaluating interconnection standards, elaborating:
An ideal instruction would very briefly explain.., that a carrier has an obligation under
the Communications Act to interconnect, but may deny interconnections if it determines
that the public interest is to the contrary; and that if the carrier at the time had a
reasonable basis in regulatory policy to conclude, and in good faith concluded, that
denial of interconnections is required by concrete, articulable concerns for the public
25 2
interest, then there is no liability under the antitrust laws.

The Supreme Court has yet to endorse this specific way of
accommodating antitrust and regulatory law, but language in the
Court's opinions is not inconsistent with it.253 In the context of
complex regulatory scenarios, in which careful evaluation of subjective
intent as well as the objective standard for complying with the public
interest is necessary, this defense holds greater promise for ensuring
that competitive safeguards are in place than does the short-hand
invocation of a field tariff shield.
In addition to the regulatory compliance jury defense, the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction already provides a sufficient safeguard
for those situations in which regulators actively monitor rates, terms
and conditions of service. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
in "cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience
of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative
discretion, ' 254 a court defers to the agency on regulatory matters in
order to allow the agency to consider them first. The Supreme Court
has observed:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular
agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the
circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts
by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible
25 5
procedure.

252. Id. at 1138.
253. See, e.g., Nat'l Gerimed. Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452 U.S. 378, 393 n.19 (1981)
(noting, in the context of potential regulation of hospital's conduct by cooperative agencies, that
on remand "the court should give attention to the particular economic context in which the
alleged conspiracy and 'refusal to deal' took place"); see also Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 889 F.2d
224 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that defendant's good faith was established); Phonetele, Inc. v.
AT&T, 664 F.2d 716, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1981) (Kennedy, J.) (stating that if a defendant can
establish "it had a reasonable basis to conclude that its actions were necessitated by concrete
factual imperatives recognized as legitimate by the regulatory authority, then its actions did not
violate the antitrust laws").
254. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
255. Id. at 574-75. For further discussion of practical aspects of applying this doctrine, see
Robert B. von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction,67 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1954).
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As Judge Friendly recognized, 256 a court has the power to stay a
judicial proceeding pending agency decisions in such a case, although
257
it may also decide to dismiss a case altogether for present purposes.
In comparison to the filed tariff doctrine, the assessment of primary
25 8
jurisdiction allows courts more discretion in its application.
Unlike the filed tariff doctrine, which bars present and future
claims, primary jurisdiction does not confer complete immunity to the
allegedly anticompetitive conduct; rather, in applying the doctrine,
courts traditionally stay any judicial enforcement pending agency
regulation. As Professor Louis Jaffe recognized long ago, the
application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction emphasizes that referral
of a matter from a court to an agency is not based solely on agency
expertness, but on the entire statutory scheme. 25 9 Thus, a court's
inquiry is more suited to the problem courts routinely address in
asserting or declining jurisdiction in the horizontal context-whether
the exercise of judicial power unduly trespasses onto agency expertise
and decision-making authority. 260 Primary jurisdiction provides a less
blunt tool for courts to respect agency deference in a dual jurisdiction
enforcement context. The sweep of per se immunity can be left
entirely with implied antitrust immunity, which is not firm-specific,
and to the extent its applications are based in congressional intent,

256. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1353 (2d Cir.
1985).
257. In Nader v.Allegheny Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized that stays may be
important for two distinct reasons. 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976). The agency may not have the
statutory power to confer immunity, but still may pass judgment on the matter. Id. Or, as Far
East envisioned, a court may believe the agency is in a superior position to make findings of fact
or judgments about reasonableness. Id. at 305-06 (noting that common law misrepresentation
not within special competence of the agency); see also GE v. M.V. Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022, 1027
(2d Cir. 1987) (finding it unnecessary for a court to yield jurisdiction where the issue to be
resolved rests on general common law principles).
258. The doctrine itself has been criticized for lacking consistency in application. See, e.g.,
Hale & Hale, supra note 155, at 49 ("It cannot, however, be said that the courts have been wholly
consistent in their application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.").
259. See Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction,77 HARv. L. REV. 1037, 1057 (1964) (observing
that "[a] special problem arises where the administrative agency is not given jurisdiction to
award reparations," specifically mentioning the FPC, FERC's predecessor).
260. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction can also play this role in lieu of the filed tariff
shield in bankruptcy claims. In the cases that preceded the United States Supreme Court's
decision Maislin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit invoked the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction in evaluating jurisdiction over undercharge claims, but concluded that the
ICC could best address the claims. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F.2d
400, 403 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that "the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be exercised if
the issues in a proceeding 'turn on a determination of the reasonableness of a challenged
practice"'); INF, Ltd. v. Spectro Alloys Corp., 881 F.2d 546, 548-50 (8th Cir. 1989) (relying on
Eighth Circuit's Maislin decision and addressing concerns in ICC policy); see Rouse, supra note
170, at 688.
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minimizes the opportunities for manipulation by private firms and
judicial overreaching.
2. Vertical Jurisdictional Conflicts: State Action Immunity
Modern antitrust jurisprudence also potentially extends the
filed tariff doctrine's reach to a second context, vertical, in which both
federal and state regulators have approved tariffs relating to allegedly
anticompetitive conduct. In this context, it is conceivably the stateapproved tariff that makes antitrust enforcement unnecessary. Some
states do not explicitly endorse the filed tariff doctrine, as a matter of
state law, 26 1 but, regardless of whether a state independently does so,
state action immunity serves functions similar to those the filed tariff
doctrine purports to serve, again making it unnecessary.
State action immunity is designed to accommodate the federal
antitrust interest in promoting competition with state interests in
regulation. When state regulation works to restrict competition, these
two interests may collide. In Parker v. Brown, the United States
Supreme Court addressed this conflict in reviewing the potential
antitrust liability of state officials enforcing a program that fixed
raisin prices and restricted competition between growers. 262 The
Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to restrain "state
action," effectively creating absolute immunity for pure state actors,
but the Court did not address the potential liability of private parties
263
operating under the auspices of state law.
Later cases extended state action immunity to private parties
whose allegedly anticompetitive acts were the product of, or approved
by, state action. As the Supreme Court stated in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., immunity for private
actors exists only if the challenged restraint is taken pursuant to a
'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed ... state policy"' 264
and is subject to active state supervision. 265 The clear articulation
requirement does not require a defendant to show that state law
compelled the challenged actions, 266 but instead only that the state

261. See supra note 87.
262. See 317 U.S. 341, 346 (1943).
263. Id. at 351.
264. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978)).
265. See id. at 105-06.
266. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 60-61 (1985)
("[W]e do not read [previous case law] as making compulsion a prerequisite to a finding of state
action immunity"); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1985) (holding that
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affirmatively contemplated the type of activity challenged. 267 Given
this low threshold, the active supervision requirement does most, if
not all, of the heavy lifting in determining whether state action
immunity applies to private actors. 268 Courts have held that this
requirement is not automatically met when the state "simply
authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties" because such a broad authorization would merely "cast[ ] . . . a
gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a price-fixing
'269
arrangement.
In the context of dual rate regulation schemes, state action
immunity can have the same effect as the filed rate doctrine at the
state level, while also providing courts flexibility to evaluate the
deterrence implications of declining jurisdiction. In Town of Concord
v. Boston Edison Co., then-Judge Breyer assessed a price squeeze
claim brought under these circumstances. 27 0 FERC regulated Boston
Edison's wholesale electric power rates, while its retail rates were
regulated by state authorities.2 7 1 Municipal utilities, such as the
Town of Concord, challenged Boston Edison's wholesale prices as
anticompetitive, on the grounds that the utility's wholesale price
increases, approved by FERC, had not been matched by corresponding
retail price increases at the state level. 272 The municipality claimed
that the disparity between the two rates put the towns in a price
squeeze, making retail customers more likely to purchase directly
from Boston Edison and thus placing the municipal customer base at
risk. 273 Properly declining to apply the filed rate shield-because this
basis for refusing jurisdiction is particularly problematic in the
context of price squeeze claims, where sometimes neither the federal

state statutes satisfied the clear articulation requirement, where the state delegated to its cities
"the express authority to take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive effects").
267. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42 ("It is not necessary... for the state legislature to
have stated explicitly that it expected ...anticompetitive effects ....[I]t is sufficient that the
statutes authorized the City to provide sewage services and also to determine the areas to be
served. We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad
authority to regulate.").
268. An exception to this is cases involving municipalities and other subordinate state
entities, which must affirmatively show state authorization to enjoy state action immunity but
do not have to show active state supervision of their actions. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 4647 & n.10.
269. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1987) (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at
106)).
270. 915 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990).
271. See id.
272. See id. at 20-21.
273. See id. at 21.
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nor state regulator has authority to rectify an antitrust violation 274 Judge Breyer reasoned that Boston Edison enjoyed no express
immunity from the application of the antitrust laws, but recognized
that careful analysis of the price squeeze claim is necessary in the
context of regulated industries. 2 5 Regulators continue to monitor the
reasonableness of rates, as well as the relationship between utilities
and their competitors. 276 In addition, Judge Breyer noted that
regulation makes it less likely that a price squeeze would drive
independent distributors from the marketplace, since the permission
of regulators is required to take on new customers. 277 He further
observed that supporting a price squeeze claim in such circumstances
is at odds with the goals of price competition to the extent that it
would encourage greater retail rates, and that there were potential,
institutional concerns with courts telling regulators what rate to apply
under the circumstances. 278 Judge Breyer concluded that "a price
squeeze in a fully regulated industry such as electricity will not
normally constitute 'exclusionary conduct' under [the] Sherman Act..
"279

Judge Breyer's analysis addressed the price squeeze claim on
its merits. This is understandable given that, in the context of this
specific price squeeze claim, it was unclear whether the
anticompetitive conduct was the wholesale rate, the retail rate, or
both. 280 However, on similar facts-where the state regulates retail
rates and the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is at the retail level

274. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 721 F. Supp. 1456, 1460-61 (D. Mass. 1989)
("[Elnforcing the antitrust laws is not the FERC's paramount objective, and the only remedy the
FERC can grant is to reduce the wholesale price to the lower end of the 'zone of
reasonableness,'. . . which, depending on where the retail price is set, may or may not be enough
to eliminate the price squeeze." (quoting City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173,
1178 (8th Cir. 1982) and Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976))).
275. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 21-22 ("Even though Boston Edison is a regulated
firm, it has no blanket immunity from the antitrust laws.... [W]here regulatory and anti-trust
regimes coexist, antitrust analysis must sensitively 'recognize and reflect the distinctive
economic and legal setting' of the regulated industry to which it applies." (citations omitted)).
276. See id. at 25-26.
277. See id. (noting that regulators maintain prices at "reasonable levels" and have the
authority to prevent monopolists from "improperly disadvantaging" new competitors).
278. Id. at 27 ("A rule that penalizes the filing of wholesale rate increases would not
necessarily lead firms to abandon wholesale rate increases; it could, instead, simply lead them to
seek a retail rate increase whenever they seek a wholesale rate increase .... [A]n anti-pricesqueeze rule ... presents special administrative difficulties in the regulatory context.").
279. Id. at 28. Other circuits, however, reject Town of Concord's limiting price squeeze
analysis. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting Town of Concord's price squeeze analysis as "too restrictive").
280. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 27 ("Much electricity investment is used to serve both
wholesale and retail services.").
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only-state action immunity might allow a more complete analysis of
28 1
the deterrence benefits of allowing an antitrust claim to go forward.
If a state actively supervises the regulation of retail rates, for
example, this could implicate state action immunity in price squeeze
and other antitrust claims. 28 2 Thus, if courts are satisfied with the
monitoring provided by state regulators (including their ability to
deter wrongdoing by regulated firms), there may be no need to address
the merits of antitrust claims, creating the same effect as the filed
tariff shield-even in instances where a state lacks its own state-law
version of the doctrine.
Such an approach has significant advantages over the filed rate
doctrine, as it focuses on the degree and effectiveness of overlapping
state supervision, rather than on the simple act of filing or approving
a tariff. Courts have yet to fully determine how state action immunity
will apply in a full or partially deregulated environment. It is fair to
predict, though, that as market norms emerge in formerly regulated
industries, state action immunity will likely be available less often
than was previously the case. 28 3 For example, in a recent case
involving a utility's offer of a discounted rate to a customer that was
conditioned on the customer's agreement to forego development of its
own generation plant, a United States District Court agreed with the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division that such conduct was not
protected from antitrust attack by state action immunity. 28 4 Although
the New York state legislature had authorized reduced rates to
"prevent loss of ... customers," and the New York Public Service
Commission had approved the reduced rate contract, the court held
that the state legislature did not foresee or intend the anticompetitive
281. This analysis is not limited to price squeeze claims, but includes other allegations of
antitrust law violations in a deregulated environment as well. See Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust
Law Regulation: A New Focus for a Competitive Energy Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79, 97-112
(2000) (addressing other claims likely to develop in competitive power markets, including tying
and market allocation and collusion).
282. See, e.g., Keith A. Rowley, Note, Immunity from Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims: From
Keogh, Parker and Noerr to Town of Concord and Beyond, 70 TEX. L. REV. 399, 416-20 (1991)
(discussing the state action doctrine and regulatory price squeeze claims).
283. See, e.g., Jefferey D. Schwartz, The Use of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine in the
Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1477-89 (1999) (discussing the
future application of the state action doctrine in a deregulated market place).
284. See United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175-76 (W.D.N.Y.
Other cases, however, have continued to find state action immunity, even where
1998).
competition has begun to change the industry. See, e.g., N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican
Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1999) (a local utility's refusal to transport cheaper
power from other power generators to a steel mill located in its exclusive territory was subject to
antitrust immunity since the state had clearly established retail service areas); TEC
Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding state action
immunity in cogenerator's refusal to deal claim), modified, 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996);.
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features of this arrangement, particularly to the extent it resulted in
28 5
the removal of a competitor.
None of these doctrines-robust federal preemption, primary
jurisdiction, or state action immunity from antitrust enforcementwas available early in the twentieth century, when federal courts first
developed the filed tariff doctrine to help protect customers against
discrimination in rates. 28 6 The filed tariff doctrine was questionable
even before these doctrines developed, but today it is even more
unnecessary. Further, by encouraging perverse behavior by private
actors that is largely beyond the reach of the judiciary-thus widening
the jurisdictional gap in enforcement of market norms-the doctrine is
harmful. Using the filed tariff doctrine as an independent legal
reason to preempt state law claims, or refuse jurisdiction over
antitrust and other federal claims, gives short shrift to the public
interest in the context of dual regulatory enforcement. In a dual
enforcement regime, the jurisdictional inquiry must focus on the
relationship between the agency and the courts, or the agency and
state law, rather than on the deceptively simple act of filing a tariff
with a regulatory body. These alternative doctrines provide federal
courts the flexibility necessary to do this. Similarly, in states that
recognize the doctrine, an analysis of primary jurisdiction would
suffice to protect agency discretion.
There are, as proponents of the filed tariff doctrine would
claim, potential costs to replacing the per se approach of the filed tariff
shield with these alternative doctrines. Specifically, proponents might
raise concerns with the impact of these alternative doctrines on
regulatory commitments and uncertainty in regulated industries.
Neither of these concerns has merit.

285. See Rochester Gas, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76. The court found that, since a material issue
of fact existed as to whether the wholesale customer was a bona fide competitor of the utility, it
could not determine whether a violation of the antitrust laws existed. Id. at 176. Ultimately, the
DOJ and the utility settled the case, agreeing that the contract language prohibiting the
university from producing and selling power in competition with the utility would be dropped.
See United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., 1998-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 72,200, at 82,302
(W.D.N.Y. 1998). In a more recent case out of the Ninth Circuit, a defendant's refusal to wheel
power to customers located in its old service area was held not to be immune under the state
action doctrine, since state supervision of the conduct was lacking, although the Idaho statute
clearly protects electric customer from pirating by other suppliers. See Snake River Valley Elec.
Ass'n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2001).
286. For instance, the Federal Power Act was not passed until 1935 and broad implied
federal preemption decisions evolved many years later. Primary jurisdiction doctrine as a
defense to antitrust cases did not fully evolve until the middle of the twentieth century, von
Mehren, supra note 255, at 935-41, and state action immunity was not recognized until 1943.
See supra note 262-263 and accompanying text.
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The regulatory commitment argument for continued adherence
to the filed tariff shield-i.e., valuing tariffs for promoting certainty
and uniformity-proves too much.
To be sure, regulatory
commitments remain important to infrastructure-intensive industries,
even in a deregulatory era. However, as has been argued in this
Article, since it is increasingly rare for agencies to independently
evaluate tariffs, the filed tariff shield allows firm-specific private
behavior to play more of a direct role in creating regulatory
28 7
commitments than is desirable from a social welfare perspective.
More importantly, absent the filed tariff doctrine, agencies possess
adequate authority to make regulatory commitments. Without the
doctrine, agency decisions would have the full force and effect of other
government regulations, but no more. The filed tariff doctrine turns
private behavior into a regulatory commitment, even where there is
little or no regulatory action by an agency. This comes at the obvious
cost of creating too strong of an incentive for one-sided private
lobbying of an agency, even where the agency is unable to effectively
regulate private behavior. In contrast, without a filed tariff doctrine,
regulatory commitments would be more meaningful from a political
accountability perspective, to the extent that an agency's regulatory
decisions would more closely reflect its own choices or Congress'
rather than the strategic choices of private firms.
Concerns with uncertainty also fail to justify continued
adherence to the filed tariff doctrine. Allowing more adjudication in
federal courts will inevitably increase uncertainty for firms in
deregulated markets. Such uncertainty, however, is not inconsistent
with that presented by other competitive firms facing antitrust claims,
28 8
as well as tort and breach of contract claims, in federal courts.
Moreover, such uncertainty may have benefits for the lawmaking
process: if private firms can no longer obtain certainty through
tariffing, this will encourage private firms to focus their lobbying
efforts on Congress, calling for expansion of agency jurisdiction and
resources. Compared to private firms focusing their lobbying efforts on
agencies, which assist firms in benefiting from the filed tariff shield
but have little ability to police the type of conduct courts normally do,
the net effect of such a change in lobbying behavior would be to
enhance social welfare. In this sense, the proposal to replace the filed
287. See supraPart III.A.
288. While this Article speaks primarily to the current regulatory environment, its
endorsement of an increased judicial role echoes proposals from a different regulatory era. Cf.
Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:An Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 475 (1954) (arguing that courts should assume the
general responsibility for defining the policies within which economic administration functions).
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tariff shield with alternative doctrines better promotes responsible
behavior by private firms in the lawmaking process in a deregulated
environment, while simultaneously enhancing deterrence.
Because battle lines are shifting, and the role of tariffs is
changing, application of the filed tariff shield is particularly adverse to
consumers and competitive markets in circumstances where a more
complete analysis of the regulatory issues would reveal limited agency
regulatory oversight in the context of tariff approval and monitoring.
The common law is hardly perfect-its remedies will be slower in their
realization and less predictable than regulation-but absent express
efforts to preempt and supersede it, it is necessary to deter
wrongdoing in competitive markets.
VI. SURRENDER

The thin-lipped armorer,
Hephaestos, hobbled away;
Thetis of the shining breasts
Cried out in dismay
At what the god had wrought
To please her son, the strong
Iron-hearted-manslaying Achilles
Who would not live long.28 9
The filed tariff doctrine has had a questionable and curious
history. Even under traditional natural monopoly regulation, it is not
clear that the filed tariff doctrine was necessary to protect consumers
from rate discrimination, to promote federalism, or to respect agency
deference. Although the doctrine began with consumer protection
aspirations, by the end of the twentieth century it evolved into a
shield for utilities against consumer protection litigation. It was
eventually co-opted by courts in ways that seriously constrain agency
discretion. Indeed the exact purposes of the doctrine were never made
clear and on inspection, many of the rationales proffered in support of
the doctrine fail to justify it as an independent basis for a court to
refuse to consider a case.
Invoked today as a shield, providing ultra-immunity for firms
against antitrust and common law claims, the filed tariff doctrine is
not only unnecessary; it has seriously harmful effects.
Courts
routinely overreach, applying the doctrine in ways that preclude the

289. W.H. AUDEN, The Shield of Achilles, in SELECTED POEMS 198, 199.200 (Edward
Mendelson ed., 1979).
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enforcement of federal and state laws designed to enhance competition
and consumer protection.
Further, the doctrine creates private
incentives for manipulation of the regulatory process in ways that
escape monitoring by courts and regulators. Limited jurisdiction and
resources of regulatory agencies allow the filed tariff doctrine to
expand the gap in the dual jurisdiction system for enforcing market
norms. The result is more radical deregulation-markets absent even
antitrust or common law enforcement-than either Congress or
agencies intend. A decision to forgo judicial remedies should depend
on an assessment of the scope of public enforcement, not on private
tariffing conduct. Today, doctrines such as federal preemption and
federal antitrust defenses and immunities promote clarity and
accountability in regulatory law, and courts have at their disposal
ways of respecting agency discretion without invoking a filed tariff
shield. These alternative doctrines envision a way for courts to
protect the public interest by safeguarding against strategic uses of
the regulatory tariffing process in a dual enforcement system.
In an environment that affirmatively promotes competition and
the development of markets, courts would best protect the goals of
regulatory law by refusing to give filed tariffs any independent, legally
significant role. The filed tariff doctrine's shield should be lowered,
subjecting traditionally regulated industries to the same potential
legal liabilities, along with access to the same defenses and
immunities, as other firms in competitive markets.

Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the
Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics
Robert A. Prentice

56 Vand. L. Rev. 1663 (2003)

Legal scholars have increasingly begun to use principles of
behavioral psychology, cognitive science, and related disciplines to
inform legal analysis. Much of this analysis has been motivated by
perceived limitations of economic analysis of law, particularly its
foundational assumption that man is a rational maximizer of his
expected utilities ("Chicago Man"). Drawing in substantial part
from the work of Nobel Prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman and his late colleague Amos Tversky, behavioral decision theorists have argued that legal analysis should be based upon more realistic models of human activity (hence, "K-T Man'). As behavioral
analysis of law has grown in popularity, inevitably it has come under attack on several dimensions. This article (a) defends both the
scientific integrity and legitimacy of this new mode of analysis, and
(b) defends its particular applications by legal decision theorists.
The author argues that attempts to paint the heuristics and biases
literaturefounded by Kahneman and Tversky as the mere product of
parlor tricks used in laboratory experiments involving college
sophomores will ring increasingly hollow as new techniques of
neuroimaging continue to produce evidence of brain activity substantiating these limitations on human reasoning.

